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The thesis is composed of three papers on market frictions and financial intermediation. It
explores the impact that different forms of market frictions have on the choice of capital
structure of financial institutions or on the fragility of the financial system.
Chapter 1 proposes a model of how securitisation can alleviate investment distortions that
arise within banks if the latter have a high level of risky debt. In a securitisation a bank
will retain an equity-like tranche of the securitised portfolio as a commitment to proper asset
selection and monitoring. The model suggests that banks with a high deposit base benefit from
securitisation more from the perspective of reduction of investment distortions. The model
predicts that for assets with high default recovery value the bank decreases its screening and
monitoring of the assets when the retention by the bank exceeds certain threshold. However,
for assets with low default recovery value a higher retention leads to better screening.
Chapter 2 analyses how a risk of a fire sale liquidation affects the debt structure of financial
institutions. A fire sale occurs when a financial institution needs to sell some of its assets,
but the potential buyers of these assets are themselves financially constrained. I show in a
theoretical framework that when a bank holds an asset with a small set of potential buyers,
it will prudently choose to borrow less of short-term secured debt. Thus, a possibility of a
fire sale liquidation disciplines the bank when the liquidity of its assets is low. However, if
a financial institution holds an asset that has a large set of potential buyers, such financial
institution will borrow too much of short-term secured debt thus increasing the risk of a fire
sale spillover.
In chapter 3 I evaluate the resilience of a financial system to shocks when financial insti-
tutions are connected to each other through interbank loans. When one or several banks go
bankrupt, they default on their interbank liabilities, which can in turn put its banking counter
parties in financial destress. I consider a financial system in which a shock can propagate both
through the network of interbank loans, but also through the centralised asset market. First,
I find that the higher is the number of interbank connections each bank has, the higher is the
resilience of the system to the shocks. Second, a network structure where a few banks have a
high number of connections (core) while the rest of the banks are connected mainly to those




La the`se est compose´e de trois papiers sur les frictions de marche´ et interme´diation financie´re.
La the`se est compose´e de trois articles sur les frictions de marche´ et l’interme´diation finan-
cie`re. Elle explore l’impact que les diffe´rentes formes de frictions de marche´ ont sur le choix
de la structure du capital des institutions financie`res ou sur la fragilite´ du syste`me financier.
Le chapitre 1 propose un mode`le expliquant comment la titrisation d’actifs peut atte´nuer les
distorsions d’investissements dans les banques qui de´tiennent un niveau e´leve´ de dette risque´e.
Lors d’une titrisation, une banque e´mettrice de´tient une tranche dite junior du portefeuille
titrise´ afin de garantir son engagement dans la se´lection et le controˆle des actifs sous-jacents. Le
mode`le sugge`re que les banques avec une large base de de´poˆts be´ne´ficient plus de la titrisation
graˆce a` une re´duction des distorsions des investissements. Le model pre´dit que pour les actifs
avec une large valeur de recouvrement en de´faut les banques diminuent leurs efforts de se´lection
et de controˆle des actifs une fois que leur taux de re´tention de´passe un certain niveau. Par
contre, pour les actifs avec une faible valeur de recouvrement une re´tention plus e´leve´e induit
une meilleure se´lection des actifs.
Le chapitre 2 analyse comment un risque de liquidation de type ” fire sale” affecte la
structure de la dette des institutions financie`res. Un ” fire sale ” a lieu quand une institution
financie`re a besoin de vendre une partie de ses actifs, mais les acheteurs potentiels sont eux-
meˆmes financie`rement contraints. Je montre the´oriquement que si une banque de´tient un actif
qui a un petit nombre des acheteurs potentiels, elle choisira prudemment d’emprunter moins
de dette a` court terme garantie. Ainsi, la possibilite´ de liquidation en ” fire sale ” discipline les
banques si la liquidite´ des actifs est faible. Par contre, si une banque de´tient un actif avec un
grand nombre des acheteurs potentiels, elle empruntera troˆp de dette a` court terme garantie
ce qui augmente le risque de ” fire sale ”.
Dans le chapitre 3 j’e´value la re´silience du syste`me financier a` des chocs lorsque les banques
sont connecte´es l’une a` l’autre a` travers des emprunts interbancaires. Quand une ou plusieurs
banques font faillite, elles sont en de´faut de paiement sur leurs dettes interbancaires, ce qui
a` son tour peut amener leurs contreparties bancaires a` une de´tresse financie`re. J’analyse un
syste`me financier dans lequel un choc peut se propager non seulement a` travers le re´seau des
emprunts interbancaires mais aussi a` travers le marche´ centralise´ des actifs. Le mode`le sugge`re
que plus le nombre de contreparties de chaque banque dans le syste`me est grand, plus la
re´silience du syste`me face aux chocs sera e´leve´e. De plus, un re´seau bancaire dans lequel un
petit nombre des banques posse`de un grand nombre de contreparties (core) tandis que d’autres
banques sont principalement connecte´es aux banques du ” core ” est plus vulne´rable aux chocs
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Introduction
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 highlighted multiple sources of fragility of the finan-
cial system. Some sources of fragility bear a systemic nature which means that a financial
institution, which would otherwise be financial sound, can be brought into financial destress
because of the events unrelated to its own economic activity, for example because of a fire sale
externality or default cascades due to network of interbank exposures. Fire sale externality
can arise if one or a group of financial institutions has to sell a large amount of financial assets,
which pushes the market price of these assets down. Given that the asset side of banks’ bal-
ance sheet is marked to market, and that banks face leverage constraints, a large exogenously
given price decline can force other banks, which would have otherwise been financially sound,
to de-lever and sell their assets. Additional asset sale pushes the asset prices further down. A
downward price spiral occurs propagating losses to financial institutions across the financial
sector. Fire sale spillover occurs because banks hold same or similar assets and therefore the
shock is propagated through the decline in the market asset prices, but not because banks
have direct exposures one to another. Contrary to that, network default cascades occur due
to the direct exposures that banks have against each other, i.e. interbank loans. If one bank
collapses, it defaults on all its debt that it owes to other banks, pushing its banking counter
parties under financial stress. If one or several of these counter parties in turn default on their
own interbank liabilities, a cascade of defaults due to network effects begins. Chapter 2 and 3
are dedicated to these two sources of systemic fragility.
The latest global financial crisis also highlighted problems related to securitisation, a process
when a bank sells the loans it issued to a separate legal entity which structures and tranches
these loan portfolios into asset backed securities (ABS) which are further sold to investors.
Securitisation allows banks to free up capital for new loans and investments, and share risk
with the rest of the financial participants who are willing to bear that risk. There is a problem
however, which is that the quality of the loans that a bank sells is not observable by the buyers
of the ABS. As a result, banks might have incentives to sell loans of poor quality and keep
loans of better quality to themselves. Poor screening of the sub-prime mortgage borrowers is
one of the causes of the financial crisis of 2007-2009.
In chapter 1 of the thesis I contribute to the analysis of costs and benefits of securitisation.
First, I show that securitisation can reduce bank’s investment distortions due to a presence of
high level of risky debt if the bank retains an equity-like tranche of a securitised portfolio as a
commitment to proper loan screening. Second, I analyse the optimal level of bank’s retention
in the securitised portfolios.
Securitisation, through a sale of assets to a special purpose vehicle, limits the claims of the
buyers of the asset backed security only to the assets that back the ABS, but not to other
assets of the bank. As a result, the set of priority claimants that benefit from new investments
before shareholders decreases, and a bank undertakes positive net present value (NPV) projects
that a non-securitising bank would have forgone. To illustrate a mechanism I develop a model
where securitisation is accompanied by a moral hazard problem. The costly effort that the
bank puts into loan screening is unobservable, and so is the quality of loans. Because of this
moral hazard problem an originating bank retains an equity-like tranche of the securitised
portfolio as a commitment to loan screening. The model suggests that a higher retention by
the bank leads to higher effort to screen the loans if the loan recovery value in default is low.
1
For loans with high default recovery rates, the relationship between bank effort and the size of
the retained tranche is hump-shaped because an increase in the amount of loans that back the
ABS increases the expected payoff of the ABS holders in default, if the default recovery rate
is high. If the level of bank retention exceeds certain threshold, the sensitivity of the cost of
ABS to effort decreases, and the bank chooses to screen less.
In chapter 2 I analyse how banks adjust their capital structure in anticipation of a possible
fire sale spillover. I build a model in which bank capital structure and asset liquidity are
intertwined, causing excessive leverage spirals. Banks issue short-term secured debt to finance
asset purchases. When market prices of pleadgeable assets decrease, banks are unable to
roll over their short-term debt and are forced to liquidate assets. This creates a fire sale
spillover. In anticipation of fire sales banks adjust their ex-ante capital structure. If the
market liquidity of an asset is high, the price decline in a fire sale liquidation is low. As a
result, high market liquidity of pledgeable asset decreases the cost of a potential fire sale for
a bank and creates incentives to take too much of the short-term secured debt increasing the
risk of forced deleveraging in the future. When the liquidity of pleadgeable asset is low, in case
of a fire sale liquidation banks anticipate a higher price decline. The possibility of a costly
asset liquidation disciplines the banks and they borrow less. As a result, the possibility of a
fire sale decreases. Therefore, the model suggests that the anticipation of a fire sale spillover
disciplines financial institutions only if the liquidity of their pledgeable assets is low. Compared
to social optimum, banks raise too much debt as they do not internalise the impact of their
leverage choice on equilibrium asset prices. The model supports regulatory minimum capital
requirements, while it puts in question policies based on regulatory price support. The latter,
while being efficient ex-post, ex-ante creates incentives for the banks to borrow too much of
the short-term secured debt increasing the chance of a fire-sale spillover.
In chapter 3 I propose a model of contagion in a financial network where a shock that hits
a bank or a group of banks can propagate in the financial system though two channels: direct
network of interbank exposures and a fire sale externality. When some banks in the system
are hit by a shock and are unable reimburse their interbank liabilities, it reduces financial
soundness of its banking parties and their the ability to reimburse their own liabilities. A
bank unable to honour its liabilities sells its assets in a centralised market to the banks in the
network who have resources to buy the assets of liquidated banks. If few banks default and the
rest of banks have enough of resources to acquire the assets of insolvent banks, the asset price
will remain high. As a consequence, a higher asset price increases the default recovery value,
which in turn improves the ability of banks to support the asset price. The findings suggest
that a more densely connected network is able to sustain a higher level of asset prices, thus
limiting the spread of default cascades in the system. Core-periphery network is more prone
to systemic collapse and decline in asset market price than a non-concentrated network.
2
Chapter 1
The Bright Side of Securitisation
1.1 Introduction
Securitisation is a controversial topic. On the one hand, it is an important financial innovation
that allows banks to free up capital to invest in new projects, and to transform illiquid loans into
liquid marketable securities (Gorton and Metrick (2012)). On the other hand, securitisation
is largely blamed for the role it played in the financial crisis. For example, securitisation was
blamed was reducing bank lending standards. Keys et al. (2010) find that the default rate of
a loan portfolio which is easier to securitise was 0.5% – 1% higher than that of a loan portfolio
with a similar risk profile but with lesser ease of securitisation. Before the crisis banks largely
used securitisation to engage in regulatory arbitrage rather than risk sharing: they would sell
the loans to a special purpose vehicle (SPV), thus laying the risk off the balance sheet, and then
provide credit or liquidity guarantees for the SPV (Acharya et al. (2013)). As these guarantees
were not included in the calculation of the minimum capital requirements, the capital charges
of banks were lower, while their risk exposure did not change. Securitisation has also been
blamed for creating funding fragility: some ABS were of short-term maturity, while the assets
backing these securities were long-term. This effectively led to a collapse of the short-term
asset-backed funding (Acharya et al. (2013)).
In this paper I contribute to the analysis of costs and benefits of securitisation. First, I show
that if banks retain an equity-like tranche of a securitised portfolio, securitisation can mitigate
the debt overhang problem because it limits the set of priority claimholders that benefit from
the future investment before the shareholders. Second, I analyse the optimal size of a tranche
that banks should retain.
Securitisation is an off-balance sheet debt financing.1 A bank sells a portfolio of loans to
a SPV which restructures, tranches into senior (debt-like) and junior (equity-like) tranches,
and then sells the securities backed by a pool of loans to investors. The loan originating bank
usually retains some interest in the sold portfolio, such as a junior tranche (Gorton and Metrick
(2013). The existing literature (Chiesa (2014), Ayotte and Gayon (2010)) suggests that the
true sale of assets that securitisation entails provides protection for the buyers of the ABS
against the bankruptcy of the loan originator, bankruptcy remoteness. In this paper I argue
that the sale of assets to the SPV also reduces debt overhang because it creates a segregation
1I do not analyse synthetic securitisation, when the risk transfer is achieved by purchasing of credit deriva-
tives, while the exposures remains on the balance sheet of the loan originator.
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of liabilities.
The debt overhang problem arises from the agency conflict between shareholders and
debtholders, because the former are the residual claimholders (Myers (1977)). When debt
is risky, a company acting in the interest of shareholders might forgo positive NPV projects
because otherwise mainly the existing debtholders would benefit from the investment. Empir-
ical literature finds evidence that debt overhang has a first-order effect on investment policy.
For example, Favara et al. (2017) look at sample of non-financial firms in distress. They doc-
ument that firms with lower expected shareholder payoff in default invest less and in riskier
projects. The debt overhang can be even more pronounced for financial firms, because bank
leverage is much higher than the leverage of non-financial firms.2 I show that securitisation
helps alleviate the debt overhang problem because the claims of the ABS holders are limited
only to the assets that back the ABS. If these assets do not perform well, the ABS holders
seize them and recover their residual value in default but have no claim against the rest of the
assets of the loan originator. As existing debtholders do not benefit from future investment,
a larger value from these investments accrues to the shareholders, and the bank undertakes
projects that would have otherwise been forgone.
To illustrate this mechanism, I build a model featuring a deposit bank that faces demand
for loans of a given size, the bank is a price-taker and faces exogenously given loan rates. Bank
deposits are not enough to finance the loans, and the bank has to raise additional debt. It
can issue either on-balance sheet or off-balance sheet debt, but not a combination of the two
types. Deposits are insured by the government, which imposes a minimum capital requirement
on the bank.
Raising additional debt is accompanied by a moral hazard problem. The bank can increase
the quality of loans that it finances by more intense screening, but the effort to screen is costly.
Because the effort is unobservable, the bank cannot commit to a certain level of screening
unless it is incentive-compatible. Hence, if it issues the off-balance sheet debt, the prospective
buyers of these ABS impose a minimum retention of an equity-like tranche of the securitised
portfolio as a commitment to proper loan screening. The market observes the fraction of the
securitised portfolio retained by the bank and correctly infers the effort the bank will optimally
exert. The debt is fairly priced.
When the bank issues off-balance sheet debt, in case of default the ABS holders seize
the loans that back their security, and have no claim against other assets. The bank has
different incentives to screen the securitised loans compared to the loans held till maturity for
two reasons. First, the prospective ABS buyers price their claim only as a function of the
effort put in screening the securitised portfolio, as their expected payoff does not depend on
the profit from loans retained by the bank until maturity. Second, putting more effort into
screening the securitised loans than in the loans held till maturity benefits the depositors, but
not the shareholders. If the securitised portfolio defaults but the loans held till maturity pay
off, the shareholders are reimbursed right after depositors. However, if the securitised portfolio
pays off, but loans held do not, the shareholders are reimbursed only after the ABS holders
and the depositors. Therefore, the agency conflict between shareholders and depositors alters
2The anecdotal evidence supports this claim: a senior bank executive, when talking about rise of shadow
lending, mentioned that after the crisis banks were busy cleaning up their balance sheets, rather than issuing
new loans, while nonbank financial institutions did not have anything to clean up and they picked up the
lending.
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the screening incentives of the bank.
In the model the debt overhang problem arises because the bank knows that in the future
it might face a more attractive investment opportunity, but this opportunity is uncertain. If a
fraction of the existing loans is financed with securitisation, a larger value from the new project
will accrue to the shareholders. The bank anticipates how its current financing decision and
effort will affect the future investment and chooses what type of debt to raise today and how
much screening effort to put. In my model the debt overhang does not result in a reduced
quantity of loans financed, but in a higher minimum return that the bank will require on a
loan.
The model yields the following results. First, issuing off-balance sheet debt results in a
higher shareholder value than issuing on-balance sheet debt if the level of deposits is sufficiently
high compared to the amount of loans the bank needs to finance. If deposits are low, the bank
has to raise a large amount of the off-balance sheet debt. The prospective ABS buyers will
therefore require a higher retention, but the ability of the bank to retain is limited by the low
level of deposits and equity. The cost of the off-balance sheet debt rises, and the bank switches
to the on-balance sheet funding. Lower debt overhang implies that a securitising bank has a
lower required return on the investments, and it can offer a lower interest rate to its borrowers
compared to a non-securitising bank. This result is driven only by liability segregation, and
not by regulatory arbitrage or costly equity issuance: in the framework I propose the bank
puts the same amount of equity regardless of the form of debt financing it chooses.
This result is consistent with the empirical literature on securitisation and the cost of debt
for bank borrowers. Nadauld and Weisbach (2012) document that spreads on corporate loans
originated by securitisation-active banks are 11 basis points lower than spreads on corporate
loans issued by other banks, holding other factors constant. Similarly, Guner (2006) finds that
”the average yield spread on loans originated by active loan sellers is about 20 basis points lower
than the average spread on loans originated by moderate loan sellers”. The model presented in
this papers offers a novel rationale for these results: securitisation decreases the agency conflict
between shareholders and depositors, thus mitigating the debt overhang problem.
Second, I show that the bank puts weakly less effort into screening a securitised portfolio of
loans compared to a portfolio of loans held until maturity, even when the bank retains a junior
tranche of a securitised portfolio and the ABS is fairly priced. The result is due to the agency
conflict between shareholders and depositors: shareholders do not benefit from the states of
the world when securitised loans payoff but loans held till maturity do not, as the profit is
captured by depositors. Whether the bank chooses to put as much effort into screening the
securitised portfolio as in the retained portfolio or less depends on the loan characteristics,
such as recovery value in default, the cost of screening, and the size of a junior tranche of
a securitised portfolio retained by the bank. This result offers a novel rationale to why the
existing empirical evidence on the presence of moral hazard in securitisation is mixed. On the
one hand, Keys et al. (2010), and Bord and Santos (2015) find that a securitised portfolio of
loans has a higher default rate compared to a portfolio of loans with similar risk characteristics
but retained on the balance sheet of a bank. On the other hand, Benmelech et al. (2012) do not
find convincing evidence of the moral hazard problem in corporate loan securitisation. While
Benmelech et al. (2012) argue that ”the securitisation of corporate loans is fundamentally
different from securitisation of other asset classes because securitised loans are fractions of
syndicated loans”, I suggest that the differences in findings might also result from the expected
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recovery in default of the collateral asset, the cost of screening of a particular loan type that
a bank incurs, and the size of the junior tranche retained by the bank.
Third, higher retention of a junior tranche of a securitised portfolio does not always increase
effort intensity of the bank. Consider the following hypothetical example: when the ABS
holders buy $100 debt that promises to pay $200 upon maturity, with this debt the bank
finances a unit of loans of $100 value. However, to be able to raise this debt, the bank has to
retain a junior claim on this portfolio, which means that $100 ABS claim is backed by 1.5 units
of loans, and the bank puts $50 of its on-balance sheet funds to finance the additional 0.5 unit
of loans. If loans promise $180, and in default the borrower recovers 0.4 of the promised payoff,
in case of default the ABS holders seize 1.5 units of loans and recover the 1.5×0.4×180 = $114.
Therefore, if the default recovery rate is high, a higher retention decreases the sensitivity of
the cost of debt to the effort of the bank: the debt becomes less risky not because the bank
exercises more effort, but because it is backed by a larger portfolio of loans with high recovery
value. The relationship between the screening effort and retention in this case is hump-shaped:
first effort increases with the retention, but then over-collateralisation effect kicks in, and the
effort decreases. If the recovery rate is low, a higher retention does not improve the payoff of
the ABS holders in default and it signals bank commitment to exert effort.
The assumption that the moral hazard problem is resolved through the retention of a min-
imum tranche of a securitised portfolio is critical to the claim that securitisation can alleviate
debt overhang. Before the crisis banks did not retain a junior tranche of loan portfolios they
securitised. Theory as well as anecdotal evidence (Winton and Yerramilli (2015)) points that
banks were committing to screening with their reputation: even though the market cannot
observe the quality of the underlying collateral, over time it observes the realised default rates
and can punish the bank in the future for not exerting enough effort in the past, which cre-
ates incentives for banks to bail out the securitised portfolio if it does not perform well. This
commitment mechanism only aggravates the debt overhang problem. However, when banks
commit to screening by retaining a junior tranche, which implies risk sharing between the bank
and the market rather than complete risk transfer to the market, the debt is fairly priced and
there is no reason for banks to bail out the ABS holders in bad states of the world.
Literature review. The paper relates to several strands of literature. First, it contributes to
the literature on agency conflict between shareholders and debt holders which oscillates mainly
around the optimal maturity and seniority structure that could mitigate the problem of debt
overhang (Myers (1977), Hart and Moore (1995), Diamond and He (2012), Stulz and Johnson
(1985), Hackbarth and Mauer (2011), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Leland (1998), Sundaresan
and Wang (2006), Halov and Heider (2011)). Stulz and Johnson (1985) argue that if newly
issued debt is secured it reduces the debt overhang because issuance of secured debt reduces
the cost of borrowing for a firm, as opposed to unsecured debt, and the benefit of cost reduction
accrues to the shareholders. In contrast, I show that securitisation decreases debt overhang if it
was used to finance past investments. Admati et al. (2018) suggest that firms are unwilling to
issue additional equity, and they prefer to increase rather then decrease their leverage because
leverage reduction transfers wealth from shareholders to existing creditors. Goncharenko et
al. (2018) study the impact of issuance of contingent convertible bonds (CoCos) on the debt
overhang of banks. They argue that issuing CoCos might be suboptimal for banks, who
anticipate equity issuance in the future, because future equity issuance increases the value
of CoCos. Favara et al. (2017) empirically document the presence of debt overhang in non-
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financial firms. They find that if shareholders of financially distressed firms expect to receive
less in bankruptcy, the firms invest less (debt overhang) and make riskier investments (risk-
shifting) then financially distressed firms in which shareholders expect to receive a higher payoff
in bankruptcy.
Next, the paper relates to the literature on securitisation, as well as on screening and
monitoring incentives associated with it (Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), Parlour and Winton
(2013), Winton and Yerramilli (2015), Chiesa (2008), Hartman-Glaser et al. (2012), Gorton
and Metrick (2013), Chemla and Henessy (2014), Duffie (2008)). DeMarzo and Duffie (1999)
characterise an optimal security design when a security issuer has a private information re-
garding the distribution of cash flows of the underlying asset. They conclude that the optimal
tranche to be sold to investors consists of a senior claim against the pool of loans. Parlour
and Winton (2013) study loan monitoring incentives when a bank sells a loan, or buys a credit
default swap (CDS). They find that riskier loans are monitored excessively, while safer credits
are insufficiently monitored. Winton and Yerramilli (2015) argue that in case of originate and
distribute model of securitisation, when a loan originator does not retain any fraction of the
securitised portfolio, loan screening can be maintained with reputational commitment: though
the market does not observe the quality of collateral, over time it observes the realised default
rate of underlying loans and infers the effort that the loan originator put in the past. As a
result, the market can punish the loan originator for poor loan screening by not buying the
ABS in the future. Building on this literature, I assume that the market imposes on a loan
originator a retention of a junior tranche of the securitised portfolio to align bank incentives
with those of the ABS buyers. The focus of this paper is different: I show that if a bank
commits to screening with minimum retention, can reduce the debt overhang.
The empirical evidence of the presence of moral hazard in securitisation is mixed. On the
one hand, Keys et al. (2010), Bord and Santos (2015) find that a securitised portfolio of loans
has a higher default rate than a portfolio of loans with similar risk characteristics but retained
on the balance sheet of a bank. On the other hand, Benmelech et al. (2012) do not find
evidence for the moral hazard in securitisation for the case of collateralised loan obligations.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the general model setup, Section 3
describes the optimisation problem of the bank that issues off-balance sheet debt. Section
4 shows the optimal investment decision of a bank issuing on-balance sheet debt. Section 5
presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Model description
There are three periods, (0, 1, 2). The economy consists of a representative bank and a con-
tinuum of borrowers of measure 1. I assume that the demand for loans is inelastic, but the
quantity of loans is fixed and normalised to 1.
At t = 0 the bank lends one unit, and is promised to be repaid R0 at t = 2. The face value
of debt R0 is reimbursed with probability p0, and with probability (1− p0) the bank recovers
nR0, where n ∈ (0, 1) is the default recovery rate. At t = 0 the bank also knows that with a
probability 1
2
it will have a better investment opportunity at t = 1. Because the future project
is uncertain, the bank will also invest in the project today.
At t = 1, if the investment opportunity arrives, the bank lends a unit, and the loan pays off
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R1 at t = 2. The quantity of loans the bank finances across periods is the same. Similarly to
t = 0 project, the project at t = 1 is reimbursed with a probability p1, and with the probability
(1− p1) the bank recovers nR1.
The bank can increase the quality of the loan by putting more effort into loan screening
and monitoring. The effort is costly and unobservable. The cost, associated with a probability
of success pt, for t = 0, 1, is given by γp
2
t , where γ accounts for the cost of effort.
I assume that at t = 0 the bank has exogenously given deposits in the amount k. Deposits
are insured by the government. Because of the government insurance deposits are costless for
the bank, and it has no incentives to hold equity.3 To correct for this friction, the government
imposes a minimum capital requirement on the bank. I assume that the minimum requirement
binds. This assumption is based on the empirical observation that despite the fact that banks
hold capital buffers in excess of the minimum required level, when banks face tighter minimum
requirements they replenish the buffers but go no further (Bahaj and Malherbe (2016)).4
For each unit of loans financed, the bank must put g units of equity. I assume that the
minimum equity requirement is calculated on the basis of the total loans that the bank financed.
This assumption ensures that the decision of the bank to issue off-balance sheet debt instead of
the on-balance sheet debt is not driven by the amount of capital they are required to provide.
Equity issuance is costless.
At t = 0 the bank does not have enough deposits and equity to finance the project, k+g < 1.
As such, a bank has to raise more debt: it can raise on-balance sheet unsecured debt, on-balance
sheet secured debt, or off-balance sheet debt. The three options are mutually exclusive. The
debt that a bank issues matures when the loan is reimbursed.5
At t = 1 the bank has enough deposits to finance the unit of loans, and there is no need
to issue external debt. This assumption, while simplifies the model, does not alter the results:
securitisation helps to alleviate the debt overhang if it was used to finance projects in the
past. If the bank faces an attractive investment opportunity and the loans in the past are all
financed through on-balance sheet debt, financing future projects with securitisation does not
provide the benefits analysed here. As such, assuming that banks won’t have enough deposits
at t = 1 to finance the projects would complicate the model with no additional benefits.
A bank maximises the expected shareholder value. Given that shareholders are reimbursed
after all other claimholders, the expected equity value is:
E(V ) = E(max(R0 +R1 −D, 0))− costscreening − equity, (1.1)
where R0 and R1 is the payoff from the investments in each state of the world, D is the face
value of debt due, and equity is the amount of equity shareholders invest.
The reimbursement of the claimholders in bankruptcy of a depository institution is different
from a non-depository institution because deposits have a priority in bankruptcy. For example,
3Even in the presence of a deposit insurance premium, if it is mis-priced, the bank has no incentives to put
equity.
4The interpretation to such behavior is that violating minimum requirements is costly for a bank, therefore
the excess capital serves as a buffer against potential shocks. In addition, the fact that in pre-crisis period
banks where actively doing regulatory arbitrage also supports the assumption of binding capital requirements
(Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013)).
5Note that this model excludes a possibility for repo financing: repo financing involves posting of liquid
collateral, whose value does not depend on the screening effort of a bank. This is not the case in this model.
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in the US, under the term ”depositor preference”, priority in bankruptcy was granted to all
deposits in 1993 (Birchler (2000)). This means that if a bank goes bankrupt, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) seizes the assets of a bank, reimburses the deposits
first, and all other creditors afterwards. As such, unsecured debt holders are reimbursed after
the depositors.6
The issuance of the off-balance sheet debt is achieved through securitisation: the bank can
sell a fraction of loans to a SPV, which structures it into the debt-like (senior) and equity-like
(junior) tranches. The tranches are further sold to external investors, which I will further refer
to as the market. The market recognises that there is a moral hazard problem: the effort that
the bank puts into screening the loans is unobservable, and the bank has incentives to shirk.
Therefore, the market will require the bank to hold some skin in the game in the securitised
portfolio as a commitment to proper screening. This skin in the game translates into the
minimum retention of an equity-like tranche of a portfolio that the market imposes on the
bank.
The model builds on the following key assumptions:
1. The market disciplines the bank by imposing a minimum retention of a securitised port-
folio on the loan originator. ABSs are always fairly priced.
2. The credit guarantees for the special purpose vehicles are included in the minimum capital
requirements.
3. Banks do not provide implicit recourse.
Credit guarantees are an explicit ex-ante guarantee provided by the loan originator saying
that it will ensure that the ABS holders will either receive the face value of the security, or a
given fraction of it. After the financial crisis of 2008-2009 banks are required to include the off-
balance sheet credit guarantees in the calculation of Tier 1 capital requirements, which, from
the incentive point of view, is identical to bringing these guarantees on the balance sheet of a
bank, and improving the incentives to properly screen and monitor the loans. The inclusion
of the credit and liquidity guarantees into the calculation of the minimum requirements is
equivalent to the minimum retention of a junior tranche of a portfolio by the bank, as modelled
in this paper.
The implicit recourse means that even in the absence of explicit ex-ante contractual guar-
antees to support the SPV, ex-post a bank might choose to bail-out the ABS holders out of
reputational concerns.7 The theories that try to reconcile the zero-retention of a securitised
portfolio by a loan originator with the maintained effort to screen loan applicants suggest that
in case of zero retention the bank commits to proper loan screening with its reputation: even
though the market cannot observe the quality of the loans that back the ABS, over time it
observes the default rates of the loans and infers the effort that the bank put into screening
(Winton and Yerramilli (2015)). As a result, the market can punish the bank by not buying
its ABS in the future. In such framework banks might choose to bail out the SPV if the loans
that back the security do not perform well in order to preserve their reputation. This does
6For the issuance of the secured debt, I assume that the holders of the secured debt can seize the asset that
collateralises their claim, but the remaining of their claim is reimbursed after the depositors.
7See Gorton and Metrick (2013) for the discussion of the issue.
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not alleviate the debt overhang problem, and can even aggravate it. However, in the model
I propose the bank commits to loan screening through the retention of a junior tranche. As
such, there are no reasons to bail out the SPV, because the ABS is fairly priced and the bank
shares the risk with the ABS holders, instead of transferring it completely from its balance
sheet.
In the context of the model I keep the quantity of financed loans constant. Therefore, the
degree of debt overhang is measured by the minimum level of R0 that a bank will require to
undertake the projects: the lower is the minimum R0, the lower is the price that the bank will
charge on the loan. Debt overhang does not result in the decrease in the quantity of lending,
but in a higher rate that the bank will require on the loan to undertake the investment. The
risk-taking incentives of the bank are measured by the level of effort that it optimally puts in
loan screening, which determines the probabilities p0 that loans will payoff. I first present the
optimisation problem of a securitising bank, that is, a bank that finances a fraction of its loans
through off-balance sheet debt. Then I present the model of a non-securitising bank.
1.3 Securitising bank
A bank that finances a fraction of loans through off-balance sheet debt, sells this fraction of the
loans to a special purpose vehicle (SPV). The SPV tranches the loans into senior (debt-like)
and junior (equity-like) tranches and sells them to the market. As will be shown below, a bank
will then retain the junior tranche of a securitised portfolio as a commitment to properly screen
loans. The sale of the loans to a special purpose vehicle ensures that if the bank defaults, the
holders of the Asset Backed Securities (ABS) will seize the assets that secure their claim and
will recover the value of these assets. However, if the asset that secures the ABS defaults, the
holders of the ABS cannot be residual claim holders for the rest of the bank’s assets.
The bank’s effort is unobservable, and as such is unobservable the quality of assets that
are sold to the SPV and that back the ABS. To align the incentives of the bank, the market
imposes the retention of a junior tranche of a securitised portfolio. The assumption that the
alignment of incentives occurs through the retention by a loan originator of a junior tranche
of the portfolio is based on the existing literature on optimal security design.8
Therefore, the asset side of a securitising bank is composed of a junior tranche of a se-
curitised portfolio of loans, and of a portfolio of loans held on the balance sheet until their
maturity. In what follows I use the term retained loans (loans hold) when referring to the
loans that are held on the balance sheet of a bank until their maturity. By securitised portfolio
of loans I mean loans that were financed through securitisation: these loans are sold to the
SPV, tranched, and the asset backed securities are distributed to the investors. Denote a0 the
fraction of the junior tranche of a securitised portfolio in the total amount of bank assets. The
fraction (1− a0) of the on-balance sheet funds is invested in the retained loans.
The incentives of the bank to screen and monitor the portfolio of loans which is securitised
are different from the incentives to screen the retained portfolio for two reasons. First, the
market discipline, which arises when markets impose minimum retention, concerns only the
loans financed through securitisation, but not the loans retained on the balance sheet. Second,
the differences in incentives come from the priority of the depositors in default.
8See Gorton and Metrick (2012) for the survey of the literature, as well as Innes (1990), and Duffie (2008).
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Second point merits an additional explanation. If loans financed through securitisation
default, but loans retained on the balance sheet payoff, the ABS holders get only the residual
value of collateral, and have no claim against the profit of the loans retained. However, in the
states of the world when loans retained default, but the securitised loans do not, depositors are
reimbursed after the ABS holders, but before the shareholders of the bank.9 As a result, banks
do not have incentives to put more effort into screening securitised loans, than loans retained
on the balance sheet, because depositors will reap the profit from the securitised portfolio after
the ABS holders but before the shareholders.
Therefore, while the loans that the bank finances are homogenous, the probability that
securitised loans payoff might be different from the probability that retained loans pay off. I
denote ph the probability of success of a portfolio of loans retained on the balance sheet (loans
hold), and ps the probability of success of a securitised portfolio of loans. The off-balance
sheet debt (senior tranche of the asset backed securities) and on-balance sheet liabilities of a
securitising bank are presented in Figure 1.1, where the off-balance sheet debt is shown with
a dotted line.
 
Junior tranche of 
securitized portfolio 
Loans retained by 
the bank 
Equity (𝑔) 
Deposits (𝑘) 𝑔 + 𝑘 
(𝑔 + 𝑘)𝑎0 + 𝐸(𝐷*+,) 
(1 − 𝑎/)(𝑔 + 𝑘) 
 
Senior tranche of 
securitized portfolio 
Off-balance sheet 
debt with face value 𝐷*+,  𝑝* 
𝑝1  
Figure 1.1: A t = 0 structure of a balance sheet of a bank that securitises a fraction of its
assets, together with the off-balance sheet liabilities, where E(Dsec) is the expected value of
the off-balance sheet debt with the face value Dsec.
For the ease of exposition, I first present an optimisation problem of the bank that invests
only once at t = 0. Then I show how one-period model builds in a two-period framework,
when the bank might finance loans at t = 1.
9Among the financial assets typically held by banks, only qualified financial contracts, such as repos and
derivatives, are exempt from automatic stay. Therefore, depositors have no priority claim against them.
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1.3.1 One-time lending bank
As explained before, the bank has different incentives to screen securitised portfolio versus
non-securitised portfolio. Under the conjecture that ps ≤ ph, the bank puts more effort into
screening retained loans than securitised loans. Because the loans in the two portfolios are
homogenous, putting more effort into screening is equivalent to reducing the possible states of
the world when the loan defaults. The expected shareholder value has the following functional
form:
V sec = maxps,ph
(
ps(R0 − k −Dsec) + (ph − ps)max(0, R0(1− a0)(g + k)− k)




where ps reflects the states of the world where securitised loans and loans held til maturity pay
off, and ph− ps reflects the states of the world where only retained loans pay off. If securitised
loans default, ABS holders seize the collateral in the amount (a0(g + k) + (1 − k − g)). The
quantity of the retained loans is (1−a0)(k+g). Therefore, if securitised loans default, the bank
receives R0(1 − a0)(k + g) and it has to reimburse only the deposits k. This payoff structure
demonstrates the state-contingent nature of the off-balance sheet debt: in the states of the
world when the asset that collateralises the off-balance sheet debt does not payoff, the bank
do not have to reimburse the holders of the off-balance sheet debt.
The functional form of the bank objective function under the conjecture that ps > ph is
presented in the Appendix .2.10
The incentives of the bank to screen and monitor the securitised portfolio of loans are
aligned in the following way: the bank chooses the value of the junior tranche of the securitised
portfolio that it will retain. It makes an offer to the market (dsec, Dsec), where dsec is the present
value of the off-balance sheet debt with the promised value Dsec. The market observes the offer,
and the amount of the junior tranche that the bank retained, a0(k+ g), and it correctly infers
the effort that the bank will optimally exercise given. If the offer allows the market to break
even in expectation, it accepts it, if not, the offer is rejected and the bank forgoes the investment
opportunity. The bank anticipates the market reaction, and makes such an offer (dsec, Dsec)
that the prospective ABS holders break even: dsec = E(Dsec). Once the bank raised the debt,
it chooses the level of effort that maximises expected shareholder value.
For the prospective buyers of the ABS, their expected payoff is the following:
dsec = E(Dsec) = psDsec + (1− ps)min (nR0(dsec + a0(k + g)), Dsec) . (1.3)
The r.h.s. of the equation states that with the probability ps debt holders recover the full
amount of the promised payment, with the probability (1−ps) the market recovers the residual
value of the collateral, nR0 per loan, and the quantity of loans that back the ABS is dsec +
a0(k + g), where a0(k + g) is the quantity of loans that the bank financed with its own on-
balance sheet funds to be able to commit to properly screen the securitised portfolio. The
bank needs to raise 1 − k − g today, so the present value of debt dsec = 1 − k − g, and the
10Numerically I do not find an interior solution 1 ≥ ps > ph > 0.
12




(1− g − k − (1− (1− a0)(g + k))n(1− ps)R0). (1.4)
I solve only for the case when the debt is risky.
The cost of the securitised debt increases as the recovery rate in default n decreases:
∂Dsec
∂n
= −(1− (1− a0)(g + k))(1− ps)R0 < 0. (1.5)
At the same time, the cost of debt decreases in the value of junior tranche retained, a0:
∂Dsec
∂a0
= −n(1− ps)R0(g + k)
ps
< 0. (1.6)
However, if default recovery rate n is low (zero in the extreme case), retaining a higher amount
of junior tranche does not reduce the cost of debt: ∂Dsec
∂a0
|n=0 = 0.
This implies that for higher default recovery rate n the bank can reduce the sensitivity
of the cost of debt to the effort intensity by retaining a higher fraction of the junior tranche,
a0. In other words, if the bank increases a0, and the default recovery rate n is high, the ABS
holders in default seize a large pool of loans with high recovery value, which limits their losses.
As a result, they care less about the effort intensity the bank chooses. This logic is not true
for low default recovery rate: if n is low, retaining more assets does not improve significantly
the payoff in default, and therefore by retaining a higher fraction of the junior tranche of the
securitised portfolio the bank cannot reduce the sensitivity fo the cost of debt to the effort
intensity. The sensitivity of the cost of debt to the effort intensity is critical in determining
the relationship between the optimal screening effort of the bank and the amount of a junior
tranche the bank retained, a0. When default recovery rate is low, the bank effort increases in
a0. If the default recovery rate is high, the relationship between the optimal effort and amount
of junior tranche is hump shaped. The sketch of the proof is the following. The optimal effort
to screen loans held till maturity is determined by the first order condition:
∂V sec
∂ph
= 2(1− a0)(g + k)y2ph + max(0, R0(1− a0)(g + k)− k). (1.7)
The f.o.c. implies that an interior solution for ph exists only when R0(1− a0)− k > 0. In
the opposite case, ph = ps. Under the conjecture R0(1− a0)− k > 0 the optimal level of effort
to screen loans held till maturity decreases in a0:
popth =
(1− a0)(g + k)R0 − k




2(1− a0)2y2(g + k) < 0. (1.8)
The result implies that the more the bank retains of a junior tranche, the less loans it holds till
maturity. As the amount of loans held till maturity decreases, so do the incentives to screen
these loans. As for the optimal effort to screen securitised loans, ps, I find numerically that
13





If one level of effort increases in a0 and the other one decreases, there exists such a¯0 that
for a0 > a¯0 effort to screen securitised loans is greater than the effort to screen loans held till
maturity: ps > ph. However, screening securitised loans above loans hold till maturity benefits
the depositors and not the shareholders. Therefore, for a0 > a¯0 the constraint binds: ps = ph.
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The figure 1.2 shows the change in the optimal screening effort as the value of junior tranche
retained by the bank increases.









Figure 1.2: Optimal effort to screen the securitised loans, ps, and loans retained till maturity,
ph, as a function of the size of junior tranche retained by the bank a0, n = 0.4, g = 0.1, R0 = 1.6.
Therefore, for a0 > a¯0, the bank will either increase the effort intensity for the both types
of portfolios to the effort ps, which means that popt = ps, or it will decrease the optimal effort
on the both types of portfolios to the level ph, popt = ph. The lemma below summarises the
optimal effort taking when the constraint ps ≤ ph is binding.
Proposition 1. There exists such level of parameters (k¯, g¯, n¯) that when the constraint ps < ph
binds:
• For g + k < g¯ + k¯ the bank puts more effort on both types of portfolios, popt = ps, and
the effort intensity increases in the size of junior tranche a0 retained by the bank;
• When g + k > g¯ + k¯
11The optimal screening effort of securitised portfolio is the highest root of the following polynomial of second
degree:
F (ps) =nR0(1− (1− a0)(g + k))− (1− k − g) + (a0 − (1− g − k)n− a0(g + k)n)psR0−
− 2(1− (1− a0)(k + g))p2sy2.




F (ps) = 0.
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– For n < n¯ the bank puts more effort on both types of portfolios, popt = ps, and the
effort intensity increases in the size of the junior tranche retained by the bank;
– For n > n¯ there exists such a¯0 that for a0 < a¯0 the optimal effort is popt = ps, and
for a0 > a¯0 the optimal effort is popt = ph.
The proposition 1 implies that if the recovery rate on the loan is high, the relationship
between the optimal effort and the size of the tranche is hump-shaped. The economic intuition
relates to the sensitivity of the cost of debt to the size of the junior tranche retained by the
bank, presented in equation 1.6. When recovery rate n is high, and the bank has enough of
equity and deposits g + k, then higher retention reduces the cost of debt for the bank. Once
the retention becomes sufficiently high, the market discipline weakens, and the bank reduces
its screening to the level of loans held till maturity.
1.3.2 Securitising bank, two periods
When the bank faces an investment opportunity at t = 1, it already has loans in place, some
of which are financed through securitisation, and some are financed with the on-balance sheet
funds (deposits and equity). At t = 1 the bank chooses the optimal level of effort as a function
of R1, and of the effort taken at t = 0.
The realisations of the payoffs R1 and R0 are i.i.d. The expected equity value of a securi-
tising bank at t = 1 under the conjecture that ps,0 ≤ ph,0 is:




p1 (R0 +R1 − (1− g)− k −D0,s)
+ (1− p1)max (0, nR1 +R0 − (1− g)− k −D0,s)
)
+ (ph − ps)max
(
0, p1 (R0(k + g)(1− a0) +R1 − (1− g)− k)




0, R0n(1− a0)(k + g) +R1 − (1− g)− k
)




where d0,s is the present value of a securitised debt with the face value Ds, defined in the
equation 1.3. ps and ph are the probabilities the securitised loans and loans held until maturity
payoff. k is the amount of deposits the bank had at t = 0, (1− g) is the quantity of deposits
the bank receives at t = 1. Note the state-contingent nature of the off-balance sheet debt: in
the states of the world (1− ps), when the securitised portfolio does not pay off, the bank does
not reimburse the ABS holders. In these states of the world, a bank loses the fraction a0(k+g)
of the defaulted assets, which is seized by the ABS holders, but it does not share with them
the profit from a new investment R1.





Securitising bank at t = 0
The optimisation problem of a securitising bank at t = 0 has two components: the shareholder









where V sec is the expected equity value if the bank does not invest at t = 1, defined in 1.2.
V Sect=1 is the expected value if the investment opportunity at t = 1 materialises, equation 1.10.
The optimal levels effort to screen securitised loans and loans held till maturity are defined by







Note that the optimal effort ps is chosen for a given level of Ds, and in the derivative of V
sec
0
w.r.t. ps Ds is taken as a constant. The functional form of Ds (equation 9) is plugged in the
first order condition after. The optimal level of securitisation a0 takes into account the impact
on all the variables that it will have. I solve the model numerically: for given values (R0, n, k, g)
I find the optimal ps and ph for all a0 defined on a grid, and then select a0 that gives the highest
value. I present the results in section 5 where I compare the optimal investment policy of a
securitising versus a non-securitising bank.
1.4 Investment decision of a non-securitising bank
I solve the model backwards: first, I find the optimal investment decision at t = 1 taking the
optimal decisions of time t = 0 as given. Then I solve for the optimal investment decisions at
t = 0, accounting for the fact that with a probability of 0.5 the bank will invest at t = 1 and
the optimal effort choice at t = 0 will affect the optimal effort choice at t = 1.
I first present the optimal decision making if the bank issues unsecured debt.
1.4.1 Non-securitising bank at t = 1
At t = 1 the bank already holds loans from the previous period with the face value R0, that
will be reimbursed with a probability p0 determined by the effort the bank put at t = 0. On
the liability side, it holds deposits k, unsecured debt with face value Dunsec, plus the deposits
in the amount (1− g) that it receives at t = 1.
The manager of the bank maximises the expected shareholder value w.r.t. p1. The value
function of a such bank is composed of the expected return on the loans, minus the debt claims,
and the cost of loan screening. I assume that if both loans default, shareholders get nothing.





p1p0 (R0 +R1 − k −Dunsec − (1− g))
+ p1(1− p0)max (0, nR0 +R1 − k −Dunsec − (1− g))
+ p0(1− p1)max (0, nR1 +R0 − k −Dunsec − (1− g))




where the index NoSec stands for ”non-securitising bank”. The limited liability ensures that in
case of default of one loan or of both, the payoff of shareholders is non-negative, hence the term
max (0, nR0 +R1 − k −Dunsec − (1− g)). 2g is the total amount of equity that shareholders
invest over two periods, 1 + k is the total amount of deposits, γp20 is the cost of screening per
unit of loans. V NoSect=1 must be non-negative, so that shareholders break through.
Non-securitising bank at t = 0
At t = 0 the bank knows what p1 will be as a function of the probability p0 and the promised
return R1. This investment will take place only with a probability
1
2
. At t = 0 the optimisation



















is the expected payoff to shareholders
if a bank invests only at t = 0, and V NoSect=1 is the payoff if the bank invests at t = 1, equation
1.11.
In the presence of moral hazard the unsecured debt with present value 1−k−g is priced as
follows. First the bank makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the market to buy a debt with the
face value D¯unsec, and present value dunsec, where dunsec = 1− k− g. The market observes the
offer, the level of deposits k, and the promised payoff on the investment R0, and it correctly
infers the effort that the bank will choose to put into loan screening. If the offer (dunsec, D¯unsec)
allows the prospective debt buyers to break even in expectation, they will buy the debt. If
not, the offer is rejected and the bank is left without additional funding. The bank anticipates
this, and will such an odder (dunsec, Dunsec) such that the debt is fairly priced. After the debt
D¯unsec is raised, the bank chooses the optimal level of effort. As a result, the bank does not
have incentives to shirk, and the unsecured debt is fairly priced.
From the technical perspective the time sequence presented above means that the bank
maximises the shareholder value w.r.t. p0 for a given value of Dunsec. p0 and Dunsec are jointly




1− k − g = E(Dunsec)
E(Dunsec) is determined by the prospective buyers of the unsecured debt who take into
account the probability with which they will be reimbursed in full, and the amount they
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receive if the bank goes bankrupt. Unsecured debtholders are reimbursed after the depositors
in bankruptcy. Therefore, the face value of debt Dunsec with the present value equal to 1−k−g
must satisfy the following equality:
1− k − g = E(Dunsec) =1
2





p0p1Dunsec + (1− p0)p1min(Dunsec, R1 + nR0 − (1− g)− k)
+ (1− p1)p0min(Dunsec, R0nR1 − (1− g)− k,Dunsec)




The first line in 1.13 accounts for the expected payoff if no investment is done at t = 1,
and the rest is the expected payoff if a bank finances the project at t = 1, and all funding
comes from deposits. I solve the model numerically. The results are presented below, when I
compare the optimal decisions of a securitising bank versus a non-securitising bank.
The optimisation problem of a bank that issues secured debt differs from the one presented
above only in the reimbursement of the secured claim holders in default, which affects the cost
of debt for a bank. I present the details in the Appendix .9.
1.5 Securitising versus non-securitising bank: results
The numerical solution of the model yields the following results.
First, the bank will issue off-balance sheet securitised debt if the amount of deposits is
sufficiently high compared to the amount of loans the bank needs to finance. If the amount
of available deposits is low, securitised debt becomes too costly for the bank for the following
reason. The yield on the off-balance sheet securitised debt (Dsec
dsec
) decreases in the amount of
junior tranche retained by the bank (1− k − g)a0:
∂Dsec
dsec
∂(1− k − g)a0 = −
a20n(1− ps)R0
ps(a0(1− g − k))2 < 0.
When deposits k decrease, the yield increases. To maintain the same yield, the bank has
to increase the fraction a0 of funds invested in the junior tranche. When k is low, the bank is
unable to retain more than g + k of the junior tranche, and ultimately the yield rises. Figure
1.3 shows the fraction of the on-balance sheet funds (deposits and equity) that the bank must
invest in the junior tranche of a securitised portfolio as a function of the deposits k.
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Figure 1.3: The fraction of the on-balance sheet funds that the bank invests in the junior
tranche of a securitised portfolio as a function of deposits k, n = 0.3, g = 0.1, R0 = 1.7.
Overall, the higher is k, the bigger is the difference in the equity value between a securitising
and a non-securitising bank. Figure 1.4 shows the expected shareholder value for the bank
issuing off-balance sheet debt and for the bank issuing on-balance sheet debt, when deposits
are high (k = 0.8) versus when deposits are low (k = 0.4) .
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Figure 1.4: Equity value of a bank issuing off-balance sheet (”OFF-BS”) debt versus equity
value of a bank issuing unsecured on-balance sheet (”ON-BS”) debt as a function of the payoff
R0 and of the level of deposits k, g = 0.1, n = 0.3
The fact that for the same level of R0 the securitising bank has a higher expected share-
holder value means that it can offer lower rates to its borrowers. The result is consistent
with the empirical evidence that securitisation reduces the cost of funding for bank borrowers:
Nadauld and Weisbach (2012) document that ”spreads on Term Loan B facilities originated
by securitisation-active banks are 11 basis points lower than spreads on facilities issued by
other banks, holding other factors constant.” Similarly, Guner (2006) finds that ”the average
yield spread on loans originated by active loan sellers is about 20 basis points lower than the
average spread on loans originated by moderate loan sellers”. In contrast to the existing litera-
ture the present model offers a novel theoretical explanation of why we observe a lower cost of
loans: securitisation decreases the debt overhang associated with the agency conflict between
depositors and shareholders.
Note that in figure 1.4 the bank equity value does not reach zero: in this framework the
bank needs to realise a positive profit on the loans in order to exercise effort. This is consistent
19
with the literature on bank competition and screening incentives (Allen and Gale (2004), Vives
(2010)). While the securitising bank is able to offer lower rates, it still needs to extract profit
from the investment in order to have incentives to put effort into screening.
Third, I find that the securitising bank has no incentives to put more effort into screening
the securitised portfolio of loans compared to the loans held till maturity: ps ≤ ph. The
effect is due to the fact that the holders of the ABS have no claim against the profit from the
loans retained on the balance sheet, but the reverse is not true: if retained portfolio of loans
does not perform well, depositors benefit from the profit of the securitised portfolio before the
shareholders. Thus, the model suggests that even when the market efficiently incentivises the
bank to put effort into loan screening, the agency conflict between shareholders and depositors
shifts the incentives of banks to screen a securitised portfolio as properly as a retained portfolio
of loans. Whether the bank chooses to put as much effort into screening the securitised portfolio
as in the retained portfolio depends on the loan characteristics, such as default recovery rate
and the cost of screening.
This result offers a novel rationale to why the existing empirical evidence on the presence
of moral hazard in securitisation is mixed. On the one hand, Keys et al. (2010), and Bord and
Santos (2015) find that a securitised portfolio of loans has a higher default rate compared to a
portfolio of loans with similar risk characteristics but retained on the balance sheet of a bank.
On the other hand, Benmelech et al (2012) do not find convincing evidence of the moral hazard
in corporate loan securitisation. While Benmelech et al (2012) argue that ”the securitisation
of corporate loans is fundamentally different from securitisation of other asset classes because
securitised loans are fractions of syndicated loans”, I suggest that differences in findings might
also arise because bank incentives to screen depend on the individual loan characteristics, such
as expected loan recovery value in default, and the cost of screening of each type of loan.
Lastly, I find that the effort intensity does not necessarily increase with the increase in the
amount of junior tranche retained by the originating bank. Higher retention leads to higher
effort if the recovery rate on loans is low. If the recovery rate on loans is high, the relationship
between the minimum retention and effort intensity is hump-shaped, as illustrated in the graph
b of the figure 1.5.
High recovery rate alters the optimal effort in the following way. First, it reduces the
incentives of the bank to differentiate the screening effort for securitised loans versus loans
held till maturity. When a securitised portfolio defaults, the bank has only (1 − a0)(k + g)
of loans from the unit 1 that it granted at t = 0, therefore as a0 increases, the benefit of
effort differentiation decreases. Second, from the equation 1.14, that determines the cost of
the off-balance sheet debt, it follows that higher a0 gives a higher expected recovery value in
default to the ABS holders, reducing the cost of debt.
d0 = D0ps + (1− ps)R0n(d0 + a0(k + g)). (1.14)
If the default recovery rate n is high, higher minimum retention makes the off-balance
sheet debt less sensitive to the screening effort, because in default ABS holders receive a large
amount of assets with high recovery value. As a result, the market discipline loosens, and the
bank reduces the effort to screen the both types of the loan portfolios. Thus, a high default
recovery rate leads to the over-collateralisation of the off-balance sheet debt at the expense
of the depositors. To illustrate the point better, consider the following hypothetical example.
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When the ABS holders buy $100 debt that promises to pay $200 upon maturity, the bank
finances a unit of loans of $100 value. However, to be able to raise this debt, the bank has to
retain a junior claim on this portfolio, which means that $100 ABS claim is backed by 1.5 units
of loans, and the bank put $50 of its on-balance sheet funds to finance the additional 0.5 unit of
loans. If loans promise $180, and in default the borrower recovers 0.4 of the promised payoff, in
case of default the ABS holders seize 1.5 units of loans and recover the 1.5× 0.4× 180 = $114.
Therefore, if the default recovery rate is high, a higher retention decreases the sensitivity of
the cost of debt to the effort of the bank: the debt becomes less risky not because the bank
exercises more effort, but because it is backed by a larger portfolio of loans with high recovery
value. As a result, the bank screens less.
When the recovery rate is low, larger pool of assets that backs the ABS does not increase
significantly the payoff in default of the ABS holders. In this case, higher retention reflects
the skin in the game of the bank, rather then an attempt to reduce the cost of debt through
over-collateralisation at the expense of the depositors.
loans securitised & retained








a) low recovery rate
loans held till maturity
loans securitised










b) high recovery rate
Figure 1.5: Effort intensity to screen a securitised portfolio versus a portfolio hold till maturity
as a function of the size of the junior tranche of the securitised portfolio a0 retained by the
bank, g = 0.1, k = 0.7.
The graph b in the figure 1.5 shows that when retention a0 is very low, the bank puts strictly
greater effort into screening the retained portfolio than the securitised one. For low levels of
a0 the benefit of effort differentiating is positive. As the degree of retention a0 increases, the
benefits of effort differentiation decrease. At the same time, there is a region when higher
retention increases screening incentives of the both types of loan portfolios. However, once a0
passes a certain threshold, the effect of over-collateralisation kicks in, and the screening effort
of the two portfolios decreases.
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1.6 Conclusion
In this paper I present a model that shows that securitisation can reduce debt overhang of
banks. Debt overhang arises because of the agency conflict between shareholders and debthold-
ers: given that shareholders are residual claim holders in bankruptcy, they might either forgo
some positive NPV projects, because otherwise the benefits will accrue to the debtholders only.
Securitisation creates a segregation of liabilities: the buyers of the ABS hold the claim only
against the collateral that backs the security, but not against any other asset of the bank. If
a bank used securitisation in the past, a larger fraction of the profit from new investments ac-
crues to the shareholders and the banks undertakes the projects that would have been forgone
otherwise. As a result, a securitising banks offer lower interest rates to their borrowers.
Commitment to loan screening with the retention of a junior tranche of a securitised port-
folio is critical for the mechanism described in this paper to work. If the bank does not retain a
junior tranche and commits with its reputation, as described by Winton and Yerramilli (2015),
it has incentives for banks to bail out the SPV, and the debt overhang becomes even more
severe. The model predicts that if a bank has a high deposit base, it is more likely to finance
additional loans with securitisation. The model also predicts that the relationship between the
effort intensity to screen loans and the size of the junior tranche retained by the bank can be
hump-shaped. This prediction holds for loans with high recovery value. For loans with low
recovery value larger retention by the bank leads to higher effort intensity.
22
Chapter 2
Bank Capital Structure with a Fire
Sale Externality
2.1 Introduction
Short-term funding is an important source of financing for financial institutions, and it played
an important role in the amplification of the financial crisis of 2007-2009. While in normal times
banks can roll-over their short-term debt, if the market is hit by a shock, a contraction of short-
term funding can follow. Thus, the short-term funding of asset backed securities contracted
by 1.4 trillion (Krishnamurthy et al. (2014)), which is sizable given that the aggregate value
of the assets of US bank holding companies was 16 trillion in 2009 (Hanson et al. (2011)).1
Following a short-term funding dry-up in 2007-2008, banks, unable to rollover their short-
term liabilities, had to partially liquidate their assets. When many institutions are forced to
de-lever at the same time, and other market participants are financially constrained and unable
to support the asset prices, a fire sale spillover can occur. According to some estimations the
losses of the financial system caused by a fire sale spillover amounted up to 25 cents on each
dollar of exogenous decline in asset prices in the peak of the crisis of 2007-2008.2 The fire
sale friction, highlighted by this crisis, sparked a vivid discussion on how to measure and limit
the systemic risks of financial institutions. For example, Duffie and Skeel (2012) questioned
whether repo transactions and derivative contracts should be exempt from the automatic stay
in bankruptcy. They suggest that repo transactions with liquid collateral should be exempt
from the automatic stay, while repos backed by a less liquid collateral should be subject to
the automatic stay. In this paper I show that when banks hold less liquid pleadgeable asset, a
possibility of a future fire sale liquidation disciplines the banks and they borrow less of short-
term secured debt, because less liquid collateral carries a higher cost of a fire sale liquidation
for a bank. In case of liquid collateral banks borrow too much of short-term secured debt, thus
increasing a possibility of a fire sale liquidation.
To illustrate the mechanism, I develop a model of an industry equilibrium, in which banks
need to raise external financing in order to invest in a financial asset with uncertain payoff.
1The repo markets also experienced a run: tri-party repo with ABS collateral collapsed from 196bn to 14bn
(Krishnamurthy et al. (2014)), with the repo haircut index rising from 0% to 45% over the course of 2007-2008
(Gorton and Metrick (2012)).
2See Duarte and Eisenbach (2015).
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First a bank issues equity and unsecured debt to acquire the first unit of the asset. Then it
can use the acquired asset as collateral and raise short-term (ST) secured debt.3 This allows
a bank to buy more units of the asset. A margin haircut that applies to the ST secured debt
limits the total amount of ST funding that a bank can raise via collateralization. The optimal
level of each form of debt is a trade-off between its costs and benefits. The unsecured long-term
debt reduces the need of costly external equity, but increases the probability of default of a
bank. Issuing short-term secured debt allows a bank to buy more assets, but might lead to the
partial fire sale of assets because banks might be unable to rollover their debt.
After a bank issues the ST and LT debt, the value of the bank’s asset is realized. If the
asset value is too low and a bank cannot reimburse its debt holders, the bank is in default and
sells its assets in the secondary market. The natural buyers of the asset are the other banks
whose realized asset value is high. If the price of a collateralizable asset increases, banks can
roll-over the entirety of their ST debt. However, if the market price of the asset declines, banks
find themselves unable to roll-over their ST debt. This happens because banks are subject to a
time-varying borrowing constraint, which arises endogenously because the asset side of bank’s
balance sheet is marked to market. When the market price of the asset decreases, the asset side
of the balance sheet shrinks, and a capacity of a bank to borrow against collateral decreases.
Therefore, if the market price of the asset goes down, a bank might be forced to de-lever.
The natural buyers of the asset are the other banks in the industry whose realized asset
value is high. The market price, determined in the market clearing, produces a spillover on
banks’ collateral value and ultimately on their debt capacity: if a large number of banks
defaults and a price drop is large, other banks can exceed their borrowing capacity and will
be forced to partially liquidate their asset. Banks rationally take capital structure decisions in
anticipation of a potential fire sale.
The model draws a link between the bank capital structure and the asset liquidity and
bears three main implications.
First, the level of secondary market liquidity of an asset ? defined throughout the paper
as the degree to which an asset preserves its value when it changes its ownership? affects
to a large extent the financing incentives of a bank. High asset liquidity increases the set
of potential buyers, even if all of them are financially constrained. This implies that even in
periods of crisis and fire sale liquidations a higher market price is sustained due to the presence
of a larger set of potential buyers. This reduces the cost of a fire sale liquidation for a bank and
provides an incentive to take the maximum short-term secured debt. For any negative market
price change banks are unable to roll-over the entire debt and have to liquidate their assets at
a fire-sale. From a regulatory perspective, requiring a higher margin haircut for assets with
high liquidity can help make short-term debt less risky.
Second, the expected market price of the collateral asset affects the level and composition
of bank debt. Higher market price of the asset lowers the cost of a fire-sale spillover for a bank,
hence the incentives to take more short-term secured debt are higher. This suggests that the
policy of a lender of last resort (LOLR) to support market price of financial assets provides
incentives for banks to take more short-term debt ex-ante, thus increasing the risk of a fire-sale
spillover and the need for a LOLR intervention ex-post.
3This newly acquired asset can be again posted as collateral to raise new funding, but the total amount of
collateralized debt is limited by the margin haircut.
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The effect of the expected market price on the optimal level of LT unsecured debt is twofold.
On the one hand, higher market price of the asset increases the total value of a bank in default,
so, ceteris paribus, the cost of LT unsecured debt should be lower. However, as price goes up,
banks issue more ST secured debt. This means that while the total payoff to claim holders in
default increases with the increase in asset price, it is the ST secured claim holders who ripe
the benefits. In anticipation of this, unsecured debt holders require a higher yield on debt and
banks find it optimal to reduce the level of LT unsecured debt as it becomes too expensive.
Third, when banks anticipate high added value from acquisitions of the assets of defaulted
banks, they preserve some ?spare borrowing capacity?: they choose to issue less LT unsecured
debt today, to be able to finance the acquisition of the assets with a debt issue in the future.
With high asset liquidity the potential buyers expect to extract more value from the acquisition,
if they themselves remain solvent. This provides incentives for the banks to be more prudent
and to reduce the probability of their own default by substituting the LT unsecured debt with
equity. The empirical prediction of this result echoes the one of Morellec (2001) and Weiss and
Wruck (1998): higher asset liquidity increases the debt capacity of a firm only when the debt
is secured by highly liquid asset.
Finally, I analyze the social planner’s optimal choice of debt. In the model the social planner
(SP) maximizes the total lending by banks and engodenizes the impact that banks leverage
choice has on the equilibrium asset price. I find that SP takes less debt than what banks in
a competitive equilibrium (CE) would take.This is a numerical result. This result suggests
that imposing minimum capital requirements on the non-depository financial institutions is
desirable from the social planner point of view.
Literature review. The present paper relates to a strand of literature on bank leverage,
asset liquidity, and financial fire sales. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) pioneered the idea of the
fire sale liquidation. They develop a model in which they show why an asset can be sold below
its economic value. An asset can be liquidated below its economic value if the natural buyers
of this asset are themselves financially constrained. The present paper is related to the model
by Bernardo et al. (2015), who study the idea of an asset liquidity and debt capacity in a
framework of rational expectations equilibrium: firms choose their debt as a function of price,
which is determined in the market equilibrium depending on the supply of and demand for the
assets. They show that the degree of asset liquidity can both increase and decrease the optimal
level of debt firms choose depending on the degree of the debt overhang problem within a firm.
They also analyze the impact that the strength of debt holder’s rights has on the optimal
leverage choice. The present paper differs from the paper of Bernardo et al. (2015) along
the following dimensions. I study the optimal choice of leverage of financial firms, compared
to a non-bank firm in the model of Bernardo et al. (2015). The financial firms face a fire
sale friction that comes with their choice of leverage structure. Second, I analyze the optimal
choice of short-term secured and long-term unsecured debt, contrary to a one type of debt in
Bernardo et al. (2015). Acharya and Viswanathan (2011) explain liquidity dry-ups in a model
with a fire sale friction and inability of banks to roll-over an exogenous level of short-term debt
due to the risk-shifting problem. Contrary to their paper, I analyze how the capital structure
of banks is ex-ante affected by a possibility of future fire sales, with bank’s leverage decision
and fire-sale friction arising endogenously.
The present model contributes to the analysis as to how asset liquidity affects the borrowing
capacity of a firm. Williamson (1988) argues that higher asset liquidity increases the level of
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debt that banks will be able to take through the impact that the asset liquidity will have on
the recovery value of assets in default. On the other hand, Morellec (2001) and Weiss and
Wruck (1998) suggest that higher asset liquidity can increase the debt capacity of a firm only
when the debt is secured by highly liquid asset. In this paper I show that once fire sale cost
is endogenously determined, high asset liquidity makes the cost of taking secured debt lower,
but higher secured debt increases the cost for the unsecured debt. Thus the latter goes down.
Li and Ma (2016) endogenize asset fire sales, bank run and the effect of contagion in a global
game framework, but take the liability side of the balance sheet as endogenously given, while
I focus on the choice of liability structure of banks. Diamond and Rajan (2011) argue that
banks’ anticipation of fire sales leads to even deeper fire sales and to a credit freeze. Acharya
et al. (2011) show how the amount of liquidity that banks hold is affected by the prospects
of potential fire sales: with high prices the pledgeability of risky assets is high, and there is
little incentive to hold cash. Hence, a sudden adverse shock leads to a situation when financial
institutions overall have little liquid assets to support the falling prices.
On the empirical side, Gan (2007) and Leary and Roberts (2014) document the impact of
collateral on debt capacity and the impact of an industry level of leverage on the leverage choice
of individual firms. Gropp and Heider (2010) document that bank’s leverage is determined by
similar factors than the leverage of non-financial firms.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model, Section 3 provides
equilibrium results for the benchmark case without the fire sale externality. Section 4 pro-
vides equilibrium results of the economy with a fire sale externality, and Section 5 contains a
comparative analysis of the impact a fire sale has on the optimal leverage decisions of banks.
Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Model description
2.2.1 Informal model description
This is the model of rational expectations equilibrium. At date 0, there is a continuum of
banks, and each bank raises external funding to acquire an asset. To acquire the first asset,
banks can raise either external equity or long-term unsecured debt. External equity is costly,
hence it can be optimal for a bank to raise some unsecured long-term debt. Once banks have
an asset, they can use it as collateral to raise short-term secured debt. The maximum amount
that banks can raise in the form of short-term debt is limited by a margin haircut.
After banks choose the optimal capital structure, the asset value is realized. The asset
value is bank-specific, and if that asset is transferred in the hands of bond-holders, they do
not have the expertise needed to extract the payoff from the asset. Hence, if the asset value
is not enough to pay off the debt holders, the bank is liquidated and its asset is sold in the
centralized market.
The short-term nature of the secured debt and the marked-to-market balance sheet of banks
gives rise to a time-varying borrowing constraint. The level of secured debt cannot exceed the
borrowing capacity of a bank. However, because the balance sheet is marked to market, the
borrowing capacity changes with the changes in the market price of the asset. Hence, if the
market price goes down, the borrowing capacity of a bank decreases. This has implications for
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the short-term debt: if a bank took too much debt in the previous period and the borrowing
capacity decreased, it cannot rollover the entire amount of debt, and is forced to de-lever. The
partial sale of the asset, entailed by such deleveraging, creates additional supply of the asset in
the market and reduces its market price further down. In turn, this decreases the borrowing
capacity of banks, pushing them to sell more of their asset. Thus, a fire sale spillover occurs.
A fraction of solvent banks with a high realized asset value are willing to acquire the asset
in the secondary market. The rational expectations setting implies that the price that clears
the market equals the price conjectured by the banks.
When banks choose the optimal capital structure mix, they also take into account the
following elements:
• The market price of the asset. It determines not only the cost of a fire sale spillover, but
also the bank value in liquidation and consequently the cost of the unsecured debt.
• The expected value from the acquisition of the asset in the secondary market. The
amount banks can raise to finance the acquisition of assets in the secondary market is
limited by the total debt banks already hold on its balance sheets. Therefore, if the
expected value from the acquisition is high, banks have an incentive to reduce the level
of debt they take ex-ante, to take advantage of attractive acquisition opportunities later.
I solve the model in the following way. First, I find the optimal level of each type of debt
as a function of the expected market price of the asset. As each bank is infinitesimally small,
it does not take into account the impact it might have on the market price, which means that
it takes it as given. The optimal level of debt corresponds to the industry choice of debt,
because I consider only symmetrical equilibria when all banks are ex-ante identical. Given the
industry choice of debt, I determine the supply and demand for the assets and find the level
of price that clears the market. In equilibrium, the level of price conjectured by banks equals
the level of price that clears the market. Next, I compute the optimal level of both secured
and unsecured debt for the market clearing price. This gives equilibrium quantities.
2.2.2 Formal model description
There is a continuum of risk-neutral banks of measure 1, and 3 periods, 0, 1, 2. At t = 0 a bank
can invest in a project with an uncertain payoff, Vi. The asset is the same across all banks, but
the realized payoff will be different, because it depends on the screening and monitoring skills
of a manager of each bank. At t = 0 a bank knows that the payoff of the asset is uniformly
distributed over the interval (0, 2), and its price at t = 0 is P0 = 1.
4 The value of the asset
becomes known at period t = 1, and the payoff takes place at t = 2. At t = 0 a bank decides
how much debt to take to finance the acquisition of the asset.
A bank finances the acquisition of the asset by issuing long-term unsecured debt and equity.
The number of units that bank buys with unsecured debt and equity is normalized to 1.
The face value of unsecured debt is D. The debt-holders are risk-neutral, hence they will
provide to the bank the expected value of their payoff, denoted D0. The remaining (1 −D0)
is financed by issuing equity. The cost of issuing one unit of equity is s. No additional equity
issuance is possible in next periods.
4I assume that there is an unlimited perfectly inelastic supply of the asset.
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Next, a bank can buy more of the asset, by posting the acquired unit of the asset as
collateral. With an asset of value equal to 1, a bank can raise (1− h)× 1 of funds, where h is
a margin haircut. I assume a bank cannot post as collateral the assets that will be acquired
in the future: this obliges a bank to raise funds for the first unit with equity and unsecured
debt. Having borrowed (1− h), a bank can acquire (1− h) units of the asset and post it again







(1− h)i = 1− h
h
(2.1)
where M corresponds to the number of times that banks posts newly acquired asset as
collateral. It follows from the equation 2.1 that the maximum amount of the collateralized debt
a bank can issue is limited. The limit equals the amount a bank can raise by collateralising an
infinite number of times.
I solve only for the equilibria when short-term debt is risk-free, hence the amount of debt
that bank receives equals to the face value: H0 = H. A sufficient condition for that is that
P1 ≥ 1− h, where P1is the equilibrium market price at period 1.
Therefore, at t = 0 the total face value of bank’s debt is the sum of secured and unsecured
debt it issued, (H0 + D). The amount of equity is (1 − D0). The total number of the asset
purchased is (H0 + 1), and the quantity of the asset posted as collateral is
H0
1−h .
A bank optimally chooses H0 and D that maximize the expected firm value. The optimal
level of each type of debt sets its marginal cost equal to marginal benefit. The benefit of issuing
long-term unsecured debt is the reduction of the cost of external equity financing, and the cost
of issuing unsecured debt is increase in the bank’s default probability. The benefit of taking
short-term secured debt is the possibility to buy more units of the asset. The cost is a threat
of fire sale liquidation in case the market asset price goes down.
At period t = 1 banks learn the payoff of their asset. A fraction of the banks are unable to
repay their debt and their assets are sold in the secondary market at price P1 per unit of the
asset, where P1 is an equilibrium market asset price.
At t = 2 the asset of each bank pays Vi, and all claimholders are reimbursed.
The timeline of the decisions is presented in the picture below.
• Asset payoff becomes known
• Firms decide whether they
default or not
• Market for secondary asset
take place
• Asset pays off





Figure 2.1: Model timeline.
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2.2.3 Bank’s borrowing capacity and fire sale externality
I define a borrowing capacity of a bank in a similar way proposed by Shleifer and Vishny
(2010).
A bank that holds E0 units of cash can buy E0 units of assets at price P0 = 1. In the case
of this model this cash includes the value of equity and long-term debt. Using secured source
of funding, a bank can raise additional E0(1− h) of funds and acquire more assets. The total




(1− h)i ≤ E01− h
h
(2.2)
By adding E0 on both sides of the expression 2.2, the following inequality is obtained:






where E0 +H0 is the total value of assets on the bank’s balance sheet.
The expression 2.3 has the following interpretation: a firm can borrow short-term against
collateral as long as the ratio of equity divided by total market value of the assets is above the
margin haircut. At t = 0 a bank cannot exceed its borrowing capacity by construction, because
it actively chooses its level of debt at this period and at this point the constraint translates in
the fact that a bank cannot collateralize more then infinite number of times.
However, everything changes in the next period: at t = 1 the asset price moves from P0 = 1
to P1 where P1 is determined in the market clearing. A bank already holds on its balance sheet
the level H0 of secured debt from the previous period and needs to roll over it. Following the
change in the market price, the market value of equity and long-term debt becomes




where P1(E0 +H0) is the marked-to-market value of the assets of a bank at t = 1.
5
In t = 1 the borrowing capacity of a bank is limited in a similar way as in expression 2.3:
h ≤ E1
P1 × (H0 + E0) =
E0 +H0(1− 1P1 )
E0 +H0
(2.4)
From the expression 2.4 it follows that when price increases from one period to the next, the
borrowing capacity also increases to the previous period. When price goes down, the capacity
shrinks.
If at t = 1 the borrowing capacity is exceeded, which means the inequality 2.4 is not
satisfied, a bank has to sell a part of its assets.
Below I explore conditions for H0 and P1 under which a borrowing capacity of a bank
at t = 1 increases or decreases. If a borrowing capacity increases, a bank can raise more
5Strictly speaking, the market value is P1
E0+H0
P0
where E0+H0P0 is the number of assets acquired in period
t = 0. But P0 = 1, hence everything simplifies to P1(E0 +H0).
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short-term secured financing. If it decreases, it might be forced to partially de-lever.
Let m be the minimum number of the asset a bank has to sell if it exceeds its borrowing
constraint, or (−m) be the maximum number of an asset a bank is able to acquire due to the
increased borrowing capacity. In both cases the expression 2.4 is satisfied with equality. The
value of secured debt H1 and of long-term liabilities E1 at t = 1 are respectively:
H1 = H0 −m× P
E1 = (1 +H0 −m) ∗ P1 −H1 = (1 +H0 −m) ∗ P1 − (H0 −m× P1)
where 1 + H0 − m is the number of the asset on the balance sheet after a forced sale if
m > 0 or after an acquisition if m < 0.





(1 + E0) ∗ P1 − E0
P1(1 + E0 −m)
Therefore,
m =
(h− 1)(H0 + 1)P1 +H0
hP1
Next I analyze the sign of m and determine the conditions under which the borrowing
capacity of a bank expands (m < 0) or contracts (m > 0):
1. A firm faces an increased borrowing capacity, meaning it can acquire more assets and
m < 0, when it chooses H0 as a function of price P1 such that:{
P1 ∈ (1, 2)
H0 ∈ (0, 1−hh ){






This has the following interpretation: when the asset price P1 goes up compared to the
previous period, no fire sale spillover will occur regardless of the level of collateralized
debt taken by banks. However, when the price movement is negative, P1 < P0 = 1, then
only if the bank was prudent and took a low level of secured debt, it can avoid a need to
de-lever and consequently a fire-sale liquidation.
2. A firm has to sell m units of its assets when the price P1 is low, and a bank chooses a
high level of H0: {








This means that if the price movement is negative, a bank might be forced to sell a part
of its assets only if it unprudently issued too much short-term secured debt. A bank
cannot rollover its debt even though H0, if held to maturity t = 2, is risk-free.
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2.2.4 Market for the assets of bankrupt firms
After the asset value realizes, a fraction of banks that are unable to payoff their debt obligations,
will liquidate their assets in a secondary market. The demand for these assets comes from a
fraction of banks that hold an asset with high realized value. Their highest valuation of the
asset comes from their expertise. When a bank j goes bankrupt, and a bank i acquires its
assets, the acquiring bank gets a value of nVi from the acquisition, n ∈ (0, 1). The coefficient
n corresponds to a degree of asset liquidity, or asset redeployability, the degree to which a new
acquirer can extract value from the new asset. In the context of financial industry it could
correspond to the debt management and debt collection skills of an acquiring bank. Acquiring
bank pays price P1 for a unit of the asset, hence the added value from the acquisition is
(nVi − P1). Therefore, the buyers will be banks with the asset value Vi s.t. Vi ≥ P1n .
Next, as long as Vi ≥ P1n , firms will be willing to acquire an unlimited amount of assets
because it will increase the firm value: there is no more uncertainty at t = 1.
In order to define the demand of acquiring banks for the assets on the secondary markets,
I make the following assumptions:
1. Financing of the new acquisitions of assets happens entirely through debt. This assump-
tion is supported by the empirical evidence that banks finance their asset acquisitions
mainly by issuing debt (Adrian and Shin (2014)).
2. Banks are limited in the amount they can borrow because the total amount of debt
they hold cannot exceed the existing total value of their assets.6 Thus, the debt banks
previously took limits the amount that the acquiring banks can borrow for asset purchase.
3. Only firms with a positive added value from the acquisition can obtain financing via
unsecured debt at t = 1, which is equivalent to financing a positive NPV project.7 This
means that if the price goes down and banks have to sell some of their assets, the banks
that have a negative NPV from acquisition of the asset in the secondary market, Vi ≤ P1n ,
cannot issue unsecured debt at t = 1 and use this cash to payoff a part of short-term
secured debt which they cannot rollover.8
To define the demand for the liquidated assets, two separate cases have to be considered:
when a fire sale spillover occurs and when it does not. If a fire sale liquidation takes place, the
6The quantity of the asset the bank will acquire is not included in the calculation. This is the same argument
that banks cannot post as collateral the assets they will acquire in the future.
7If price P1 is such that firms face an additional collateral requirement, firms will be selling and buying
at the same time. Firms with a positive demand for the liquidated assets of other firms when they have to
partially sell their assets, are strictly better off using debt they obtained first to post more collateral, thus
avoiding the need to sell their own asset, and then to use the rest of the money to buy the assets on the market.
For each unit of asset sold a bank looses V in period 3 but when it buys one unit of asset, it acquires only nV .
However, I exclude such possibility assuming that the unsecured debt can be used only for the sake of new
acquisitions
8At t = 1 there is no uncertainty any more with regards to the asset payoff Vi, therefore either firms cannot
obtain funding because their current debt is already higher then the realized asset value, or the debt they
obtain is risk-free. An unsecured risk-free debt is an unrealistic feature of the banking sector, that is why it
is excluded. This means that banks with the asset value Vi <
P1
n have no access to any cash to cover the
additional collateral requirement, and have to sell a fraction of their assets.
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capacity of a bank to borrow unsecured debt will be reduced because the number of assets a
bank holds on its balance sheet will be smaller:
V (H0 + 1−m) ≥ H0 −m× P1 +D + lFS × P1 (2.5)
The inequality indicates that the total amount of debt a bank can hold cannot exceed its
current book value of the balance sheet. The l.h.s. of the equation is the total value of assets
after a quantity m has been sold to satisfy the borrowing constraint. The r.h.s. is the total debt
a bank holds, plus the amount of new issues of unsecured debt it needs for the acquisition of l
unit of the asset, lP1.
9 The quantity mP1 corresponds to the value of short-term secured debt
a bank paid off using fire sale proceeds. For banks with the realized asset value nV > P1, the
added value from the acquisition is positive, hence they will be willing to acquire the maximum
number of assets they can. This means that the actual demand for the asset is such a level of
l that sets 2.5 to equality:
lFS =
V (H0 + 1−m)− (H0 +D −m)
P1
(2.6)
In the absence of a sale liquidation, the bank can raise (−m×P1) units by issuing secured
debt because it has a spare borrowing capacity, and it can also issue long-term unsecured debt
such that the total amount of debt a bank holds cannot exceed the book value of the assets.
The demand in this case has the following functional form:
lNoFS =
V (H0 + 1)− (H0 +D −m× P1)
P1
−m = V (H0 + 1)− (H0 +D)
P1
Market clearing
he supply and demand of the asset are deterministic, because there is a continuum of agents of
measure 1 and by the low of large numbers the fraction of banks that will be entirely liquidated
is
Vˆdef
2−0 , where Vˆdef is a default threshold, the asset value below which banks choose to default,
and (2 − 0) is the interval over which the asset value is uniformly distributed. Hence the
total supply of the asset in the secondary market consists of the number of assets of insolvent














where Vˆdef is a default threshold, and Isell is an indicator function that takes value of 1 when
agents are required to partially liquidate their assets.
The total demand for the liquidated assets when a fire sale occurs consists of the number of
banks willing to acquire the asset multiplied by the demand for the asset by an individual bank.






9Note that the number of assets that will be acquired in the future is not taken into account in the l.h.s. of
the expression 2.5. This goes in line with an earlier assumption that one cannot pledge assets which are not




is the threshold above which banks will be willing to acquire the asset, D+H0−mP1
H0+1−m is
the threshold above which banks will be able to raise financing for the acquisition. Only banks
with realized asset value above both thresholds will be willing and able to acquire the asset.













where l is defined in equation 2.6.
For the case when a fire sale occurs the market clearing condition is the following:∫ V def
0







V (H0 −m+ 1)− (D +H0 −mP1)
P1
dV
where the l.h.s. corresponds to the supply of assets, and the r.h.s. is the demand. The
supply of assets is increased by the additional amount m of asset units banks will have to sell
to payoff a fraction of ST debt they could not roll over. On the other hand, the demand is
limited because of this fire sale. This puts additional downward pressure on price.


















(H0 + 1)V − (D +H0)
P1
dV
where the l.h.s. corresponds to the supply of assets, the supply consists only of the assets of
insolvent banks.
Rational Expectations Equilibrium
When banks decide on an optimal level of secured and unsecured debt, they conjecture a
certain level of price P˜1 that will clear the market in the next period. As all banks are identical
ex-ante, they take the same level of debt. This means that individual bank’s leverage decision
corresponds to the industry level of secured and unsecured debt. A price P¯1 is the level of price
of the asset that clears the market at t = 1. A rational expectations equilibrium framework
implies that the price that banks conjecture corresponds to the price that will realize in the
next period: P˜1 = P¯1. Banks perfectly anticipate the price of the next period and consequently
whether there will be a fire sale spillover or not.
2.2.5 Liquidation decision
A bank takes a decision to liquidate its assets to maximize the payoff to shareholders. This
happens for values Vi s.t.
Vdef × (H1 + 1)− (H1 +D) ≤ max
(
0, P1(H1 + 1)− (H1 +D)
)
The l.h.s. of the expression is the payoff that shareholders get if bank does not go bankrupt:
it is the total value of the assets minus the face value of debt a bank holds. The right hand
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side reflects the position of shareholders in bankruptcy: they are the last to be reimbursed,
after secured and unsecured debt holders, but their liability is limited.
I consider only case when unsecured debt is risky. This means that in bankruptcy share-
holders get nothing, therefore the default decision simplifies to the following:
Vdef × (H1 + 1)− (H1 +D) ≤ 0⇒ Vdef = H1 +D
H1 + 1
Lemma 2.2.1. When the total debt is risky, which means that D+H1 > P1 ∗ (H1 + 1), where











The proof of lemma 2.2.1 is in the Appendix .3.
2.2.6 Objective function: expected firm value
As mentioned earlier, banks choose D and H0 such as to maximize their expected firm value
at t = 0. The expected firm value is composed of the following elements:
• The expected firm value in solvency;
• The expected firm value in insolvency;
• The expected value of the option to acquire assets of bankrupt firms;
• The expected loss from partial liquidation of assets, if any;
• The cost of issuing equity (this item reduces the firm value).






























where IFS corresponds to an indicator function, equal 1 when a bank has to partially liquidate
its asset.
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2.3 Benchmark economy: no fire sale friction
A fire sale friction arises because banks issue short-term debt and their balance sheet is marked
to market. In order to quantify the impact of a fire sale friction on the equilibrium capital and
debt structure of banks, I construct a benchmark economy. In this economy banks in a similar
way finance the asset acquisition by equity and unsecured debt, and they issue secured debt
to be able to buy more of the asset. However, secured debt is long term. The absence of need
to rollover the short-term debt at t = 1 removes the friction that creates a fire sale friction,
but keeps other elements of the model the same: the price at t = 1 is still determined in the
market clearing, and if banks take too much debt, its equilibrium level will be low. However,
no deleveraging takes place.
The expected firm value is composed of the expected value in insolvency, expected firm
value in solvency, expected value from the acquisition of assets in secondary market, minus the



















The details of the solution are in Appendix .4.10
As the major cost of taking secured debt is absent, it is intuitive that banks choose to take




(1− h)i = 1− h
h
As presented in the Appendix .4, the equilibrium price does not depend on the level of
margin haircut. As Figure 2.2 demonstrates, P1 is increasing in the degree of asset liquidity n.
Higher asset liquidity means a higher fraction of firms will be willing to buy the assets on the
secondary market, increasing the demand for the assets.










H+1 , I prove analytically that there is no solution with and without firesale spillover when
s ≤ 0.5. Empirically, no solution has been found for a range of parameter s even above this threshold for
models with and without firesale externality.
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Figure 2.2: The equilibrium level of price P as a function of the degree of asset liquidity,
h = 0.5, s = 0.3.
Higher expected liquidation price feeds back into the leverage decision of firms: they take
more unsecured debt D. As Williamson (1988) pointed out, the higher is the expected recovery
in default, the less is the cost of debt, the more debt banks are willing to take. In turn, a
higher level of debt increases a number of defaulted banks, and the supply of assets in the
secondary market goes up. This pushes the price down limiting to a certain extent the impact
that higher price has on leverage choice.
Figure 2.3 demonstrates that the optimal level of debt increases in the asset liquidity when
the latter is low, and decreases when the latter is high. When liquidity is low, the option to
acquire the assets in the secondary market becomes less valuable, which lowers the opportunity
cost of unsecured debt. And the opposite, high asset liquidity promises higher return from
asset acquisition in the secondary market, and banks reduce the level of unsecured debt.11
This allows banks to have some spare capacity to borrow unsecured debt at t = 1 to finance
the acquisition of the assets of insolvent banks.
This result demonstrates that the asset liquidity can both increase and decrease the capacity
of firms to take unsecured debt, which unites the views of Bernardo et al. (2015) with the
ones of Morellec (2001). The result is not specific for financial firms: within the framework of
the benchmark economy there is nothing that differentiates financial firms from non-financial
ones.







((H + 1)V − (D +H))(nV − P )
P
dV
It is obvious that it is decreasing in D and increasing in n.
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Figure 2.3: The optimal level of unsecured debt D as a function of asset liquidity n, h = 0.5,
s = 0.3.
2.4 Economy with a fire sale friction
When fire sale externality is present, the functional form of the expected firm value, as well
as the market supply and demand of the assets are different depending on whether a spillover
takes place or not.12
Therefore, I consider three possible cases:
• The asset price goes up from its initial level P0 = 1: P1 ∈ (1, 2), no fire sale spillover
occurs, and banks can borrow even more against collateral at period t = 1.
• The asset price goes down, but no fire sale spillover occurs because banks precociously
took low level of secured debt H0 : H0 <
P1−hP1
1−P1+hP1 .
• The asset goes down, and a fire sale spillover occurs because banks took a high level of
secured short-term debt H0: H0 >
P1−hP1
1−P1+hP1 .
In what follows, I present the equilibrium solution of each of three cases.
2.4.1 Market price goes up
When price is high, P1 ∈ (1, 2) banks can borrow more against collateral because a favorable
price movement creates additional borrowing capacity for banks.
Because no cost is associated with taking secured debt (see the proof in Appendix .5),




12This is a rational expectations equilibrium, hence banks will perfectly anticipate whether there is a fire
sale spillover or not.
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High liquidation price makes taking unsecured debt cheaper, and in this case banks choose
only debt financing, no equity: D0 = 1.
13 However, the total level of debt taken by banks is
too high and there is no price within the range (1, 2) that can support the supply of the assets
by failed banks. Therefore, when price is conjectured to be high, banks tend to take too much
debt, and the market breaks down.
2.4.2 Market price goes down, and no fire sale spillover occurs
The important elements of this case is that even though the price movement is negative, banks
prudently had taken a level of secured debt which is low enough to avoid a forced partial
liquidation of their assets. For this to be true, secured debt cannot exceed the level has to be
within the interval H0 ∈ (0, P1−hP11−P1+hP1 ). I find that once D is set at its optimal level determined






There are no such parameters (n, s, h) for which it would be optimal to have zero secured
debt, and a risky level of unsecured debt.14 This means that it is always optimal to have
at least P1−hP1
1−P1+hP1 of collateralized debt. The necessary and sufficient condition for the level
Hopt =
P1−hP1
1−P1+hP1 to be optimal is described in Attachment .6.
This outcome implies that when the cost of a fire sale is too high, banks take the maximum
short-term debt that allows them to avoid a need to de-lever. In this case m = 0, which means
that there is no additional borrowing capacity for banks at t = 1 to buy the assets of distressed
banks against collateral. Banks finance the acquisition of additional units of assets through
the issue of unsecured debt.
2.4.3 Market price goes down, and fire sale spillover occurs
The detailed solution is presented in the Appendix .6.







Once D is at the optimal level determined by the FOC, the optimal level of H0 is either at







When secured debt is at the upper limit, Hopt =
1−h
h
, a fire sale liquidation happens despite
the fact that banks perfectly anticipate this liquidation.
13The optimal level of unsecured debt, determined by the first order condition, is so high that the expected
value of unsecured debt, D0 is always greater then 1, which is not possible, because the number of units a bank
buys with equity and debt is normalized to 1. That is why D0 = 1 is a corner solution.
14I consider only the cases when the unsecured debt is risky. I find that whenever there is an equilibrium
with a risky level of debt, banks always choose the risky level over the risk-free level.
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When secured debt is at the lower boundary, H0 =
P−hP
1−P+hP , then the number of assets a
bank has to sell is zero. This case becomes identical to the one described in the subsection
2.4.2.
2.5 Equilibrium results
There is a unique equilibrium in this model, but there are two outcomes of the equilibrium
depending on the level of parameters.
In the first equilibrium outcome, the price goes down, banks take the maximum level of
secured debt and a fire sale spillover follows.
In the second outcome, the asset price goes down, banks take the intermediary level of
secured debt that protects against negative price movements. And no fire sale spillover occurs.
Figure 2.4 puts in perspective the optimal choice of secured debt in both equilibrium out-
comes, compared to the benchmark economy with no fire sale externality.15










Figure 2.4: The equilibrium level of secured debt H, for the economy with the friction and for
the benchmark economy without the friction, h = 0.8, s = 0.3.
The figure above illustrates a more general point: when asset liquidity is high, banks choose
maximum secured debt, the choice followed by a fire sale liquidation. It is the same level of
secured debt that would have been taken in the economy with no fire sale friction, and it
depends only on the margin haircut: Hmax =
1−h
h
. High asset liquidity supports the price of
the asset in the secondary market, lowering the cost of a fire sale liquidation for a bank.
When the degree of asset liquidity is low, banks cut the level of unsecured debt: they take
the maximum level that allows them to avoid a fire sale spillover: Hintermed =
P1−hP1
1−P1+hP1 . When
asset liquidity is low, the cost of a partial liquidation of assets is high, and banks choose to
avoid it. As demonstrated by figure 2.4, this optimal level increases with the increase in asset
15In the benchmark economy, the secured debt is long-term and there is no binding constraint at the in-
termediary period that forces banks to partially liquidate their assets. Nor can banks borrow more against
collateral at the intermediary period.
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liquidity. This is due to the fact that higher asset liquidity increases the equilbrium asset price
(see figure 2.6), and higher price reduces the tightness of the constraint that might bind in
period 1. This allows banks to take more secured debt and avoid a costly fire sale liquidation.
Figure 2.5 shows the set of parameters that determine which of the equilibrium outcomes
occurs. The level of margin haircut must be very high for the equilibrium with a fire sale
liquidation to exist. This is because I consider only risk-free collateralized debt, and I solve
only for the parameter values for which the price is sufficiently high to ensure that secured
debt is risk-free.16 For the case when banks take intermediary level of collateralized debt, the
range of values of the margin haircut that maintain the risk-free debt is much larger.














Figure 2.5: The range of values of degree of asset liquidity and haircut, for which banks choose
the maximum debt possible, H0 =
1−h
h
, and the value for which fire sale is zero, H0 =
P−hP
1−P+hP .
The cost of equity is set to be 30%, s = 0.3.
The figure 2.6 compares the price in the economy with the fire-sale friction, against the
benchmark economy without the friction. When the asset liquidity is low, on the graph below
n < 0.4, and banks avoid a fire sale liquidation, the price is the same in the economy with the
friction and in the economy without the friction. When the asset liquidity is aboven > 0.5 and
a fire sale spillover happens, this lowers the equilibrium price compared to the benchmark.
16Even though this choice limits the range of parameters of the margin haircut for which equilibrium exists,
it allows to study the equilibrium in a tractable way. Therefore, it is intuitive that the margin haircut has to
be very high to ensure that when banks take the maximum collateralized debt, it remains risk-free despite the
fire sale liquidation that this choice of debt engenders.. The case when collateralized debt is risky will be an
extension of the present model.
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Figure 2.6: The equilibrium level price P1, for the economy with the fire sale friction against
the benchmark economy without the friction, h = 0.8 , s = 0.3.
Figure 2.7 show the optimal level of unsecured debt D as a function of asset liquidity. Again,
I compare the equilibrium outcomes in the economy with spillover against the benchmark
economy without the spillover. The graph illustrates how banks change their capital structure
in response to a fire sale externality. There are two major results.
• When asset liquidity is low and banks reduce their secured debt, they take an unsecured
debt which is much higher then the level of the benchmark economy with no spillover.
• When asset liquidity is high and banks choose maximum level of secured debt, they cut
the level of unsecured debt.
The economic mechanism behind this optimal outcomes is the following.
1. Low asset liquidity increases the cost of a fire sale liquidation. This gives incentives for
a bank to cut the secured debt it issues. A lower level of secured debt leaves a higher
payoff to risky debt holders in bankruptcy, because they are paid off after the secured
claim holders. The cost of risky debt becomes lower.
2. Lower asset liquidity decreases the expected value from the option to acquire assets in
the secondary market. Lower value from the acquisition option lowers the opportunity
cost of unsecured debt: the more risky debt a bank issues att = 0, the less it will be able
to borrow at t = 1 to finance the acquisition of the assets.
These channels provide incentives for the bank to take more risky debt when asset liquidity
is low.
Further, figure 2.7 demonstrates that the reduction in the risky debt for high asset liquidity
is more dramatic then its increase for low liquidity. This highlights one more channel that
affects the optimal level of unsecured debt: level of equilibrium price. The model suggests that
optimal level of unsecured debt banks take is very sensitive to the level of asset price. Some
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numerical simulations give the result that a 1-percent decrease in price leads to a 2-percent
decrease in the optimal level of unsecured debt. This, in addition to the other two channels,
explain a dramatic fall in the optimal level of unsecured debt for high level of asset liquidity.
This channels suggest that even when banks cannot substitute one type of debt for the
other to finance their assets, the two types of debt do become substitues because they jointly
affect the probability of default of a bank, the cost of unsecured debt, and on the industry level,
of the asset prices. A lower level of secured debt leaves more “space” for a bank to take more
unsecured debt. In this context secured and unsecured debt are substitutes. Hence, banks
substitute secured debt for unsecured when asset liquidity is low, and vice versa. Moreover,
this substitution is the result of the two separate equilibrium outcomes. Within each outcome,
the level of unsecured debt generally increases in the degree of asset liquidity.17










Figure 2.7: The equilibrium level of risky unsecured debt D, for the economy with the friction
and for the benchmark economy without the friction, h = 0.8 , s = 0.3.
This channels suggest that even when banks cannot substitute one type of debt for the
other to finance their assets, the two types of debt do become substitues because they jointly
affect the probability of default of a bank, the cost of unsecured debt, and on the industry level,
of the asset prices. A lower level of secured debt leaves more “space” for a bank to take more
unsecured debt. In this context secured and unsecured debt are substitutes. Hence, banks
substitute secured debt for unsecured when asset liquidity is low, and vice versa. Moreover,
this substitution is the result of the two separate equilibrium outcomes. Within each outcome,
the level of unsecured debt generally increases in the degree of asset liquidity.18
Figure 2.8 shows the equilibrium default rate of banks. While locally, it increases in asset
liquidity, once n passes above the threshold and equilibrium outcome changes, the default
probability falls. Ex-ante, when banks take the maximum level of secured debt and a fire sale
spillover occurs, the probability of default increases, all other things being equal. However, the
17Numerically I find cases when debt decreases in asset liquidity. This is the case for high levels of asset
liquidity.
18Numerically I find cases when debt decreases in asset liquidity. This is the case for high levels of asset
liquidity.
42
anticipation of an increase in the default probability and of decrease in the equilibrium price
forces banks to reduce their issue of unsecured debt. As illustrated above, this decrease is so
dramatic that in equilibrium the probability of default decreases compared to the benchmark
with no fire sale friction.










Figure 2.8: The equilibrium level of default probability of a bank, for the economy with the
friction and for the benchmark economy without the friction, h = 0.8 , s = 0.3.
2.6 Social planner and policy implications
In this section I explore the optimal leverage choice when social planner (SP) seeks to maximize
the expected value of banks. The difference to the case of competitive equilibrium analyzed
previously is that social planner takes into account the impact that the leverage choice of firms
will have on the asset price.
2.6.1 Social planner in the benchmark economy with no fire sale
externality
To solve the social planner’s problem, I first find the price as a function of unsecured and


















Then I plug the above expression for P into the expected firm value (equation 2.3) and find
the optimal level of unsecured debt D and collateralized debt H using the first order condition.
19Market clearing condition gives two possible roots for P1 that would clear the market. However, it is easy




In this way I optimize the total size of the financial sector: the bankruptcy costs, perceived
as a loss by an individual bank, is just a transfer of value from one owner to another. As
illustrated in the figure 2.9, the level of price in a SP economy can be both higher and lower
then the price in a competitive economy (CE) equilibrium. There is a threshold of the level of
asset liquidity above which the CE price becomes higher then in the SP economy.20











Figure 2.9: The equilibrium level of price P for the economy with social planner and in case
of an economy with competitive equilibrium, s = 0.3 and h = 0.75.
Surprisingly enough, in a social planner’s economy when the price is below the level of a
competitive equilibrium and the asset liquidity n is high, the optimal level of debt is above the
level of a competitive equilibrium, as demonstrated in figure 2.10. This means that when asset
liquidity is high, and there is no fire sale friction, the social planner prefers to take more risk,
then what agents would choose in a CE. Even though I do not show a graph for the default
rate, it follows the same dynamics as the level of unsecured debt.
20I solve the case for three different levels of s, and I find that the higher is s, the higher is the threshold
above which price of a competitive equilibrium becomes higher then price in a social planner economy.
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Figure 2.10: The equilibrium level of long-term unsecured debt D for the economy with social
planner and in case of an economy with competitive equilibrium, s = 0.3 and h = 0.75.
The explanation lies in one of the opportunity cost of unsecured debt, the acquisition option.
When social planner consider the transfer of financial assets from one bank to another, then
the total level of debt actually increases this value. This is because asset price decreases in the
level of unsecured debt. Lower price gives a higher expected value of the option. Therefore,
when little value is lost when assets change their owner, SP chooses a higher higher level of
unsecured debt, compared to the CE. This means that the total marginal cost of debt becomes
lower when the asset liquidity is high, and social planner chooses a higher level of risk in
the economy. As to the level of collateralized debt, in all the numerical values tried, I have
not found any case when the regulator would take a level of debt lower then the maximum
possible. This is very intuitive, because collateralized debt increases the size of banks, but in
this framework there is no cost of a fire sale spillover. means lower price of the assets.
This result bridges two opposing views on the socially optimal level of corporate debt.
Lorenzoni (2008) argues that socially optimal level is lower then the level of a competitive
equilibrium, because agents do not internalize the impact that their leverage decision has on
the equilibrium price. On the other hand, in the model of Gale and Gottardi (2015) taxes paid
by a firm, as will as bankruptcy costs, are just transfer of assets from one hands to the other.
Therefore, in the SP economy the leverage that firms take should be higher. I show that by
introducing the concept of asset liquidity you can have both higher and lower level of debt in
a SP economy.
2.6.2 Fire sale externality and regulation
Figure 2.11 demonstrates, for given values of the cost of equity and margin haircut, that in the
economy with a fire sale friction SP takes the level of unsecured debt which is lower then the
level of a CE. Even though this result is numerical and holds only for 2 values of the parameter,
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I build a three-dimensional graph where D is a function of both h and n, and I numerically
verify for a larger set of parameter values that the risky debt in a CE is higher then the risky
debt in the SP economy.
The result has implications for the regulatory intervention. I do not model explicitly bank’s
deposits in order to abstract from such frictions as deposit insurance or implicit guarantees.
The only friction modeled here is a fire sale spillover. The model suggests that once the
friction is introduced in the economy, the socially optimal level of debt is below the level of a
competitive economy.21 Therefore, the minimum capital requirements even for non-depository
institutions can be desirable.










Figure 2.11: The equilibrium level of the probability of default for the economy with social
planner and in case of an economy with competitive equilibrium, s = 0.3 and h = 0.9.
The policy of a price commitment by a regulator are viewed as a desirable ex-ante regulatory
policy by some researchers.22 In the presence of a multiple equilibrium outcomes this might be
indeed a useful tool to influence the expectations of the financial players regarding the future
asset prices. However, the present framework highlight the incentives that such policy gives
to banks to take more risky debt, which can increase their default risk and thus increase the
supply of the assets in the secondary market. In addition, this policy might turn out to be
not only increasing the risk of banks, but will necessitate the actual intervention in the asset
market by a regulator. Hence, without putting a limit on the amount of collateralized debt
banks can take, the actual ex-post intervention of the regulator in the secondary market seem
to be highly likely.
21As explained in the previous section, this does not always hold for the economy without the friction.
22See Kuong (2015) for the details
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2.7 Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of a fire sale externality on the capital and liability structure
of banks when bank’s capital structure and market price of assets are endogenously determined
in the market equilibrium. I show that in response to the externality banks reduce their
total debt. However, they either reduce the long-term unsecured or short-term collateralized
debt, depending on the level of asset liquidity. The model predicts that higher asset liquidity
encourages banks to take more short-term collateralized debt to the detriment of a long-term
unsecured debt, and this increases the risk of a fire sale spillover. Further, I find that in a
social planner’s economy the level of bank’s debt is lower then in the competitive economy.
The results put in question such regulatory policy as price commitment and support the policy
of minimum capital requirements for non-depository institutions.
The model so far assumes no aggregate uncertainty and risk-free collateralized debt. Hence,




Network Topology and a Fire Sale
Externality
Introduction
The financial crisis of 2008-2009 highlighted the role of interconnectedness of a financial system
in the propagation of shocks from one institution to another. When a financial institution goes
bankrupt, it defaults on its obligations towards other banks that are its counter parties, which
might deteriorate their own solvency. Therefore, a collapse of a large financial institution
can lead to a cascade of defaults because banks have credit exposure towards each other. For
example, Duarte and Jones (2017) find that in the midst of the financial crisis of 2009 ”network
default spillovers can amplify initial losses by up to 25 percent”. As a result, a growing body
of literature studies how the structure of the interbank connections, network topology, affects
the degree to which a shock propagates within a financial system.1 Network resilience though
is mainly analysed as a function of two parameters: the degree of bank interconnectedness
and the strength of a shock that hits the system. When the shock is low, a densely connected
network serves as a shock absorber, because the losses are divided among a larger number of
banks, thus reducing the losses of individual banks and increasing the resilience of a network.
Once the shock passes a certain threshold, a densely connected network serves no more as a
shock absorber, but as a shock amplifier. This defines a ”robust but fragile” feature of the
financial system.2
However, the empirical literature finds that it is difficult to generate a strong contagion
merely through spillover of interbank losses.3 These papers suggest that more than one source
of contagion is necessary to generate substantial systemic losses as observed during the recent
financial crisis of 2007-2009. Additional source of contagion can be fire sale spillover, that
occurs when assets are sold at a price below its economic value because the natural buyers of
these assets are themselves financially constrained.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the resilience of a financial system to shocks in
the presence of two sources of contagion: a network of interbank liabilities and a fire sale
externality. I propose a model in which banks have exogenously given liabilities towards each
1See Acemoglu et al. (2015), Bernard et al. (2017), Gai and Kapadia (2010)
2Acemoglu et al. (2015), Gai and Kapadia (2017)
3See Glasserman and Young (2015), Degryse and Ngyen (2004), Georg (2013).
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other. Apart for interbank borrowing, banks are funded with deposits and equity. On the
asset side, each bank has loans to real economy, loans to other banks, and cash. An exogenous
shock hits the system, and some banks are unable to reimburse their interbank liabilities,
which reduces the ability of their counter parties to reimburse their own liabilities, creating a
default cascade. These banks have to sell their financial assets in a centralised market. The
natural buyers of these assets are banks from the network who have enough cash to acquire
the liquidated assets. The higher is the asset price, the higher is the ability of banks to payoff
their interbank loans, limiting the scale of default cascade and losses in the financial system.
On the other hand, low asset price enhances the default cascade.
To bypass the need to make strong assumptions on the topology of the financial network, I
simulate networks with different node degrees and study numerically the resilience of financial
networks as the degrees of connectivity changes. The model yields the following results.
First, in a non-concentrated network, in which node degree is binomially distributed, higher
network connectivity leads to a higher resilience. This result differs from the one in Gai and
Kapadia (2010) and Acemoglu et al. (2015) and can be attributed to the role that endogenously
formed liquidation asset price plays. Higher connectivity results in a higher diversification of
counter party risk and enables banks which are not hit by the shock to support the asset
liquidation price. Higher asset price allows banks who have to sell their assets to reimburse
higher fraction of their liabilities, limiting the losses of its counter-parties. In the empirical
simulations that I perform the network with the highest degree of connectivity resists to the
higher level of shock, and has the lowest frequency of systemic collapse as opposed to networks
with lower degree of connectivity.
Second, I analyse the resilience of a network with a core-periphery structure, a network
topology observed empirically in the financial sector. While the resilience of the network
increases with the degree of connectivity, a concentrated network is more prone to systemic
collapse, and is less able to support the asset market price compared to a non-concentrated
network because nodes with a high number of connections represents points of fragility in the
system. The results support the recent regulatory policy to increase regulatory requirements
for the large systemically important financial institutions.
Lastly, the model highlights the importance of the asset policy of price support on behalf
of a regulator in a core-periphery network, as this network topology is more prone to a fire sale
discounts and default cascade, and policy of asset price support can limit the degree of shock
contagion in the network.
Related literature
First, this paper relates to the literature on network topology. Allen and Gale (2000)
were the first to pioneer the idea that different network structures could either aggravate
or attenuate the crisis in the financial system, and that a more densely connected network
offers the advantage of risk diversification, thus increasing the network resilience to shocks.
Eisenberg and Noe (2001) propose an elegant framework to determine a clearing system, a
payment vector that determines the payment each participant in the system will receive from
its counter parties, if some banks in the system are hit by a shock. They show that the payment
vector exists and is unique. I use their approach to compute the payments that banks make
to each other following a shock. Gai and Kapadia (2010) use network simulations to evaluate
system fragility without imposing any assumptions on a particular network topology. The
present paper differs from Gai and Kapadia (2010) in that I incorporate a centralised market
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for the assets of defaulted banks and evaluate how two sources of shock propagation affect
the resilience of the financial system. Elliott et al. (2014) analyze networks as a function of
the degree of integration and diversification, where integration is thought of as the fraction of
firm’s assets held by other firms in the network, i.e. the lower is the fraction of assets hold by
other firms, the lower is the integration. Diversification refers to the number of counterparties
a firm has. Contrary to the present paper, in the model of Elliott et al. (2014) there is no
secondary market for assets of liquidated banks, and the asset liquidation price is assumed to
be zero.
Bernard et al. (2017) analyse an optimal regulatory intervention in Eisenberg-Noe frame-
work and show that regulator’s credibility not to bail out financial institutions decreases in
exogenousl given liquidation costs and in the degree of shock propagation, which depends on
network topology and strength of the shock. Gai and Kapadia (2011) introduce repo lending
in the framework of and Gai and Kapadia (2010) and estimate how the shocks to the margin
haircuts can affect the resilience of a financial network.
Acemoglu et al. (2015) demonstrate the ”robust yet fragile” feature of a highly intercon-
nected financial system: for low level of shocks, highly interconnected network serves as a shock
absorber, however for strong shocks a densely connected network serves as a shock propaga-
tor and poorly connected network is more resilient. While they show analytically the robust
but fragile nature of financial networks, they restrict their attention to regular networks, in
which interbank liabilities of each institution equal its interbank assets. In contrast, I do not
make an assumption of a regularity of a network and allow for interbank assets to be endoge-
nously determined as a function of simulated interbank liabilities. Caballero and Simsek (2013)
demonstrate how uncertainty about the creditworthiness of other financial institutions leads
to the freeze in the trading of assets in the secondary market and to a fire sale liquidation.
Glasserman and Young (2015) in a fairly general framework develop bounds on the losses of
banks due to network contagion.
Degryse and Nguyen (2007) as well as Boss et al. (2004) empirical analyse the structure of
banking network for the Belgian and Austrian financial systems respectively. They document
a shift in the network structure from equally distributed links to a core-periphery, in which ”a
few ”money-center banks” are linked together and linked to otherwise disconnected banks”.4
Next, the present paper relates to the literature on a fire sale externality. Shleifer and
Vishny (1992) pioneered the idea of the fire sale liquidation and show that an asset can be
solved below its economic value if the natural buyers of this asset are themselves financially
constrained. Diamond and Rajan (2011) argue that banks’ anticipation of fire sales leads to
even deeper fire sales and to a credit freeze. Acharya et al. (2011) show how the amount of
liquidity that banks hold is affected by the prospects of potential fire sales: with high prices
the pledgeability of risky assets is high, and there is little incentive to hold cash. Hence, a
sudden adverse shock leads to a situation when financial institutions overall have little liquid
assets to support the falling prices. Bernardo et al. (2015) study the impact of a fire sale prices
on the debt capacity of a firm in a framework of a rational expectations equilibrium. Higher
liquidation price of an asset increases the borrowing capacity of a firm because debtholders
expect to receive more in bankruptcy.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 1 presents the model. Section 2 contains numer-
4Degryse and Nguyen (2007)
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ical simulations for network with binomial degree distribution. Section 3 presents numerical
simulations for a core-periphery network with exponential degree distribution. Section 4 con-
cludes.
3.1 Model description
There are N banks in the system which are connected to each other through interbank bor-
rowing links. There are 3 periods, 0, 1, and 2.
At t = 0 interbank borrowing connections are established. The endogenous network for-
mation is out of the scope of this paper, and it is assumed that the network of liabilities is
exogenously given. On the asset side, a bank holds cash, short-term claims against other banks
and a portfolio of loans to the real economy. On the liability side, the bank is financed with
deposits, short-term borrowing from other banks and equity. Deposits are senior claims and
have priority in bankruptcy over the interbank debt. All banks are of the same size. Table 3.1
shows the composition of the bank’s balance sheet.
Assets Liabilities
Cash Ci Deposits D
dep
i
Interbank Assets AIBi Interbank borrowing D
IB
i
Loans ALoansi Equity Eqi
Table 3.1: Composition of the bank’s balance sheet.
The composition of the liabilities is exogenously given. On the asset side the amount of
cash is as well exogenous. The level of interbank assets AIBi and loans A
Loans
i are endogenously
determined: given that I simulate the interbank liabilities, the interbank assets are determined
as a function of the simulated liabilities. Loans to the real economy are a balancing item that
ensures that bank’s total liabilities equal total assets.
At t = 1 two events take place: banks have to reimburse their interbank liabilities, and
the system is hit by a shock. When a shock hits a system, a given number of randomly
selected banks experiences a decrease in the value of their assets and default on their interbank
liabilities. Further, I also consider system-wide shocks, when all banks simultaneously face a
shock to their assets.
At t = 2 the loans to the real economy pay off. At t = 1 the value of a unit of such a loan
is 1. Therefore, ALoansi corresponds both to the total value and to the quantity of loans held
by a bank i.
3.1.1 Network structure
In order to simulate a network, I simulate the interbank liabilities: with a given probability
nc a bank i borrows from a bank j, where nc reflects the degree of network connectivity. The
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network of interbank liabilities is represented by a directed graph, in which a node is a bank,
and a link pointing from node i to node j shows that bank i took a loan from bank j. Therefore,
the out-degree of a directed graph, which corresponds to the number of links that go out of a
node, gives the total number of banks from which a given bank has borrowed. The in-degree
corresponds to the number of links that point to a node and shows to how many banks a given
bank has lent money. The expected number of connections, in - and out- degree, for each bank
is
E(degree) = nc(N − 1)
Note that the number of average connections increases in the number of banks in the system.
Even if the probability to create a connection is low, ci = 0.08, as the number of potential
counter parties grows, so does the average number of connections each bank has. Figure 3.1
illustrates two type of network topologies: one is a fully connected network, ci = 1, the other
is poorly connected, ci = 0.08.
Figure 3.1: Two network topologies for interbank liabilities, one is fully connected network,
the other is weakly connected, number of banks is N = 20.
Two banks can hold mutual claims against each other. These claims are not netted out.
The interbank assets of each bank are endogenously determined given the structure of inter-
bank liabilities. The liabilities of each bank are evenly distributed across its counter parties.
However, the interbank assets of each bank are not evenly distributed for the following reason.
Consider a bank 1 has out-degree of 3 which means it borrowed from 3 different banks. A bank
2 has out-degree of 4. Let bank 3 be a lender both to bank 1 and bank 2. Given that all banks
are of the same size the balance sheet size can be normalised to 100. The total value of the
interbank assets is 20. As a result, bank 1 borrowed 20
3
from each of its counter parties. Bank
4 borrowed 20
4
from each of its counter parties. Bank 3, as a counter party of both banks, has
thus a claim of 20
3
against bank 1 and a claim of 20
4
against bank 2.
Consider bank j that is hit by a shock and defaults on its liabilities. Denote doutj as out-
degree of bank i. A bank i has a claim against bank j which is worth 0 after the default of bank
j. Bank i is able to honour all its liabilities if its available cash at t = 1 is greater then the
liabilities it has to pay at t = 1. Its available cash is composed of the cash it hold from period
0 plus the amount of interbank claims which are reimbursed by its financial counter parties.
The bank has to reimburse its interbank liabilities DIBi . Therefore, the solvency condition of
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a bank i is determined as {
Ci + AIBi −DIBi > 0
Ci + AIBi + A
Loans
i ≥ DIBi +Ddepi
(3.1)





and denotes the interbank assets bank i received following the
default of bank j. The first expression in 3.1 defines the ability of a financial institution to
meet its short-term liabilities given the resources they have at t = 1. Second inequality ensures
that the reimbursement of the short-term interbank liabilities is not done at the expense of
the depositors. Note that though deposits are short-term claims, when they are guaranteed
by the government, the depositors have no incentives to run on a bank. Therefore, the second
assumption is equivalent to assuming that short-term creditors are not reimbursed at the
expense of the government that guaranteed the deposits.
If the solvency condition in system 3.1 is violated, bank j is insolvent and has to sell its
loans in the centralised market to raise cash and payoff its liabilities. For simplicity I assume
that the bank sells all the loans, no partial liquidation is allowed.5 Denote P the equilibrium
market price of such an asset, P ∈ (0, 1). The upper and lower boundaries for the price are
motivated by the fact that natural buyers of this asset won’t pay more than the economic
value of these loans, which is 1. At the same time if the demand for such loans is weak, the
equilibrium price can go below 0 and the loans are sold at a fire sale price. The market clearing
condition that determines P is described below.
After the loan portfolio is sold at a price P , the depositors are reimbursed first as priority
claimholders. Financial counter parties are reimbursed proportionally to their claims hold
against a defaulted bank, in equal shares of equal priority of the short-term unsecured creditors.
















reflects the residual payoff that is left to inter-
bank lenders after depositors are reimbursed. It is bounded by 0 reflecting the limited liability
of the shareholders: in bankruptcy the losses to shareholders are limited by their equity stake
in the company. The minimum is taken to make sure that debtholders do not receive a payment
greater than the face value of their claims.
I formulate the problem using the approach developed by Eisenberg and Noe (2001). Let
p be the clearing vector: it reflects the proportion of interbank claims each bank is able to
reimburse, where pi is a proportion of the interbank claims D
IB
i a bank i can reimburse. Then

















5While this assumption inflates the supply of the assets and thus decreases the equilibrium price, this does
not alter the results: with a partial liquidation one would need a greater shock to generate the same price




i,j is the proportion of a claim A
IB
i,j a bank i receives from bank j, given the
fraction of the liabilities bank j can reimburse, pj. If a bank i has no claim against bank j,
then AIBi,j = 0.





0, C + AIBp+ PALoans −Ddep)) (3.4)
where p is the payment vector, DIB is a vector of interbank liabilities where element i
denotes total interbank liabilities of a bank i. AIB is a matrix of interbank assets: the element
AIBi,j denotes the amount bank j owes to bank i. The matrix has 0 on the diagonal. A
Loans is
the vector of total loans each bank holds, Ddep is a vector of deposits.
3.1.2 Market clearing
The market price P of the loans is determined in the market clearing condition. Though I do
not impose that all banks hold the same type of loans, I assume that the characteristics of
these loans, i.e. risk and return, yield the same price. If the price of a portfolio of loans of one
insolvent bank is below the price of a loan portfolio of another insolvent bank, then natural
buyers of these loans will shift their demand for loans with lower price, until the prices on both
types of loan portfolios are the same. Therefore, the supply of all these loans can be pulled
together.
The demand for these loans comes from the banks in the network who have available
resources to purchase the loans. I assume that banks are not strategic in their decisions and
that they won’t hold cash in the anticipation of even stronger fire sale discounts: banks will
buy the loans if they have extra cash and if the market price of these loans is not above their
economic value, P ≤ 1.
Let M be a subset of banks who went bankrupt and liquidated their assets, with the number
of elements m. N −M is therefore a subset of banks that are solvent, with the number of





The ability of a solvent bank to acquire these loans is determined by how much cash it
holds, and the amount of loans it was repaid by other banks, minus the interbank liabilities
this bank has itself:
Demandj = Cj + A
IB
j −DIBj









The equilibrium price is the level of price that sets demand equal to supply. The market
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i < Ci + A
IB
i −DIBi , then the price is P = 1 and only a fraction of solvent
banks with available cash acquires the liquidated assets. Note however, that the demand for




IBp, where p is itself a function of the liquidation price P , as can be seen from the
equation 3.4. The higher is the liquidation price of the assets, the higher is the payment vector
p. At the same time, a higher payment vector enables solvent banks to have enough cash to
acquire assets of the liquidated banks and support the asset price.
The endogenous determination of an asset price given the balance sheet structure of the
financial institutions is a modelling feature that differs from the models proposed by Acemoglu
et al. (2015) and Gai and Kapadia (2010), who assume exogenously given level of liquidation
price, which is independent of the ability of the financial system to absorb the financial assets
at their economic value.
3.2 Numerical simulations
I calibrate the model and simulate possible network connections in order to evaluate the impact
of the centralised asset market on a network stability. The network is simulated using Poisson
distribution: each pair of nodes in the network is connected with a probability nc. The
higher is nc, the higher is the network connectivity. I consider a network of 50 banks. The
calibration parameters are presented in the Table 3. The higher the ratio of interbank liabilities
towards other liabilities, the lower is the resilience of any network because banks have a higher
exposure to other banks and they become more sensitive to the shocks that hit other financial
institutions. Given that the main purpose of this paper is to compare the resilience of different
network structures to shock of the same size, with all other things being equal, the size of
liabilities w.r.t. to the total size of the balance sheet is not important.
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Parameter Description Baseline calibration
N number of banks in the network 50
C bank’s cash 2% of the total assets
AIB interbank assets endogenously determined
ALoans loans to real economy balancing item
DIB interbank liabilities 35% of the total liabilities
Ddep deposits 61% of the total liabilities
E bank equity 4% of the total liabilities
ci degree of network connectivity (0.08, 0.12, 0.16, 0.20, 1)
E(degree) average degree (3.92, 5.88, 7.84, 9.8, 49)
Table 3.2: Model parameter calibration
For each scenario I simulate 500 networks, and compute the average market price, as well
as the average number of defaults generated by the spillover.
3.2.1 Simulation results with idiosyncratic shocks
For each degree of connectivity I assume that f number of randomly picked banks fail following
an exogenous shock, f ∈ (2 : 20). Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the total number of defaults and
the equilibrium asset market price, following an exogenous shock where a number f of banks
go bankrupt and default on interbank liabilities. The horizontal axis ”Stressed Banks” shows
the number f of initially distressed banks. The vertical axes contain respectively the number
of total defaults (including exogenously defaulted f banks), and the equilibrium market price
that result from exogenous f defaults. Figure 3.2 shows that the higher is the connectivity of
the network, the greater is the ability of the system to support the asset price, and hence the


















Figure 3.2: The average equilibrium asset price.
The equilibrium asset price in the least connected network decreases faster then in more
connected networks, and this affects the average dynamics of defaults in the system. When
the liquidation price is lower, financial counter parties suffer greater losses, and their ability to
reimburse their own liabilities reduces, as demonstrated in the equation 3.3. Figure 3.3 shows




















Figure 3.3: The average number of total defaults in the system, including stressed banks that
went bankrupt because of an exogenous shock.
The numerical simulations suggest that the higher is the network connectivity, the higher
is the liquidation price and lower is the average number of defaults in the system. Therefore,
higher network connectivity increases the network resilience. Acemoglu et al. (2015) define
network resilience as an expected performance of a financial network following f negative
shocks.6 Their analytical result is based on the assumption that the asset liquidation price
across all network topologies is the same. As demonstrated in figure 3.2, the asset price
weakly increases in the degree of connectivity. Therefore, as numerical simulations suggest,
once the asset liquidation price is endogenised network resiliency increases with the network
connectivity. Another reason for why I do not find the same results as in Acemoglu et al.
6Formally, Acemoglu et al. (2015) define network resilience as an expected social surplus in the economy
following f negative shocks. The social surplus increases in the liquidation price, and decreases in the number
of defaults in the system.
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(2015) is that they restrain their attention to regular networks, networks in which the total
interbank assets of any bank in the network equal its interbank liabilities. Thus, there are no
net borrowers and net lenders. In the numerical simulations presented in this paper no such
assumption is made: any bank in the network can be either net borrower or net lender in the
interbank market. Lastly, Acemoglu et al. (2015) show that a network, in which there is a
subset of banks with very high exposure towards each other and a very low exposure towards
the rest of the system, is more resilient than ring or fully connected networks. Numerical
simulations method might not account for any particular network configuration, and therefore
might miss out this result.
A system wide stress, when assets of all banks are simultaneously hit by a shock, yield
similar results: a more connected network is more resilient than a poorly connected network.
The results of the simulations are presented in the Appendix .10.
3.3 Core-periphery network topology
In this section I present the methodology used to simulate a core-periphery network, as well as
the simulation results. This network type is of particular because it is documented empirically
that financial networks exhibit a core-periphery structure.7
To simulate such a network, I follow the algorithm suggested by Newman et al. (2001). I
assume that the in and out degree of each node follows an exponential distribution. Further,
I assume that the in and out degrees of each node are positively correlated, with a correlation
ρ.8 Figure 3.4 offers an example of such network.
Figure 3.4: Core-periphery network topology, the number of banks is N = 20.
Given that in this simulation I would like to capture a feature that a bank that is actively
lending is also actively borrowing, which implies a strong positive correlation between the
7See Degryse and Nguyen (2007).
8To simulate two correlated random variables from an exponential distribution, I first simulate two inde-
pendent variables from the distribution, and then I apply a transformation to one of the generated arrays using
an R package mc2d. The resulting two vectors of simulated variables have a specified Pearson correlation ρ.
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in and out degrees of each node, two assumptions used in the positive section are mutually
exclusive: that the interbank liability take a given fraction of the bank’s balance sheet (35%),
and that all banks are of the same size. Consider a network in which a highly connected bank
j has in degree of 10, which means that the bank lent money to 10 banks. Next, consider that
these 10 banks have only one counterparty, the bank j. The assumption that all banks are of
the same size and that interbank liabilities represent 35 of bank’s balance sheet means that
bank j has more interbank assets than the presumed size of its balance sheet.9 To overcome
the issue, I perform the following modification: after the network is simulated and the value
of each interbank connection is established in the same way as for a network with Poisson
distribution, I find banks whose interbank assets exceed 90% of the balance sheet.10 For
these banks I increase the size of the loans to the real economy, ALoans by an exogenously
given amount hi. To preserve the balance sheet identity I also increase the amount of bank’s
deposits. As a result of this transformation, banks with the highest number of connections
have a larger size, but for these banks the total value of interbank liabilities is not any longer
35% of the assets, but less. This transformation allows to solve the issue with highly connected
banks, to capture the observed feature that more connected banks tend to be larger (Li and
Schuerhoff (2017)), and by not increasing the value of the interbank liabilities of the highly
connected banks it does not create the problem for other banks that the total interbank assets
exceed the size of the balance sheet. When a bank is hit by an exogenous shock, its assets
are reduced by the an exogenously given amount zi, the same for all banks hit by the shock.
This means that more centrally connected banks which are larger and which are hit by the
shock experience a reduction in the asset value by the same absolute amount as smaller banks.
This assumption keeps the size of the shock constant and as a result it allows a comparison of
the simulation results not only for the core-periphery network, but also a comparison of the
core-periphery network with the one with binomial degree distribution. The parameters used
for the model simulation are presented in Appendix .11. The simulation results, presented in
the figures 3.5 and 3.6 show the results similar to those of the network with binomial degree
distribution: a higher connected network is able to better support the asset price and as a
result is more resilient to the propagation of shocks. The frequency of systemic collapse for the
core-periphery network is presented in the Appendix .12 and its results are similar to those of
a binomial network.
9Under the normalisation that bank’s balance sheet is 100, the interbank liabilities of bank j are 10× 35 >
100.



































Figure 3.6: Simulation results for core-periphery network, total number of defaults.
It is of interest to compare the resilience of a network with binomial degree distribution to
that of the network with exponential degree distribution. While there is evidence that networks
with exponential degree distribution are more resilient than networks with the binomial degree
distribution11, it is of interest however to compare the resilience of both types of networks once
prices are endogenised. To this end, I perform the simulation of a network with a binomial
degree distribution, but unlike in section 3.2, I use the same assumptions (see appendix .11)
as for the simulation of the core periphery network.
As presented in the figures 3.7 and 3.8, that depict the asset price in networks with expo-
nential and binomial degree distribution, unconcentrated network with a binomial distribution
is better able to support the asset prices in the system, both in cases when the networks are
poorly and densely connected.12 Figure 3.7 shows that a poorly connected non-concentrated
network is able to sustain a larger shock size until it collapses than a concentrated network
with exponential degree distribution. At the same time a network with binomial degree is able
to support to asset price for larger values of shock, thus exhibiting a lower rate of network
collapse than a concentrated network with exponential distribution. Similar results hold for
11See Gai and Kapadia (2011), Albert et at. (2000)
12Average degree for the two types of networks are 5 and 30 respectively
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the frequency of systemic collapse: it is higher in a core-periphery structure. A higher fre-
quency of systemic collapse can be explained by the fact that if a highly connected bank is
hit by a shock, it renders the entire system more fragile, thus constituting a weak point in the
system. At the same time, given that I assume that a system is hit by the same level of shock
regardless of the size of the balance sheet, the effect of a weak point in a concentrated network
is mitigated.
First, these results support the regulatory policy of increased capital and regulatory control
of large systemically important financial institutions, as those are hit by a shock and are unable
to sustain it, the shock wave will be much larger. Second, a policy of price support is of higher
importance for core-periphery than for non-concentrated networks, as the former network is











Binomial, degree=5 Exponential, degree=5
Figure 3.7: Comparison of the equilibrium price for network with exponential and binomial










Binomial, degree=30 Exponential, degree=30
Figure 3.8: Comparison of the equilibrium price for network with exponential and binomial
distribution, when the average degree is 30.
61
3.4 Conclusion
The paper aims to analyse the resilience of a financial network with two sources of network
propagation: a network of interbank exposures and a fire sale liquidation. To this end I develop
a framework in which banks borrow from each other thus creating a network of interbank
liabilities. Banks also finance loans to real economy. When some banks are hit by a shock,
they are unable to reimburse their interbank liabilities, which can create a default cascade.
When banks are unable to reimburse their debt, they have to sell the loans they issued to the
real economy in the centralised market. Other banks from the system are the natural buyers
of these loans and if they have enough cash, they will acquire these loans. If the ability of the
natural buyers to acquire these loans is limited by the losses banks incur through interbank
liability network, the loans are sold below their economic value at fire sale prices.
The model yields the following results. I find that a more connected network is able to
withstand a higher level of shock as opposed to poorly connected network and it is able to
better support the asset price. Higher asset price enables banks to reimburse a higher fraction
of their interbank liabilities which in turn helps support the asset price in the system. This
creates a mutually enforcing mechanism: higher price leads to higher recovery value in default,
which in turn leads to higher market asset price.
The comparison of concentrated networks (exponentially distributed network) versus non-
concentrated networks (binomial degree distribution) demonstrates that non-concentrated net-
works are more prone to systemic collapse, and are less able to sustain the asset price in the
market. The results suggest that a sound financial position of banks which are centrally located
in the network is critical for the stability of such networks and thus support the recent regula-




.1 Optimisation problem of non-securitising bank
Solution of the optimisation problem of a non-securitising bank that issues secured on balance
sheet debt.
At t = 1 a bank already holds loans from the previous period with face value R0, that will
be reimbursed with some probability p0 determined by the effort a bank put at t = 0. On the
liability side, it holds deposits k, unsecured debt with face value Dsec, plus the deposits in the
amount (1− g) that it receives at t = 1.
The manager of a bank maximises the expected shareholder value: it optimally chooses p1
that weighs the benefit of putting more effort (making a loan safer) against the costs incurred
from additional screening. The value function of a such bank is composed of the expected
return on the loans, minus the debt claims, minus the cost of loan screening and monitoring. I
assume that if both loans default, shareholders get nothing. The realisations of the payoff R0
and R1 are i.i.d, the expected shareholder value at t = 1 writes as follows:
V NoSect=1 =maxp1
(
p1p0 (R0 +R1 − k −Dsec − (1− g))
+ p1(1− p0)max (0, nR0 +R1 − k −Dsec − (1− g))
+ p0(1− p1)max (0, nR1 +R0 − k −Dsec − (1− g))
− (γp0)2 − (γp1)2 − 2g
) (7)
where the index NoSec stands for ”non-securitising bank”. The limited liability insures that
in case of default of one loan or of both, the payoff of shareholders is non-negative, hence
the term max (0, nR0 +R1 − k −Dsec − (1− g)). 2g is the total amount of equity that bank
shareholders put over two periods, 1 + k is the total amount of deposits that a bank collected
over two periods, γp20 is the cost of screening per unit of loans. V
NoSec
t=1 must be non-negative,
to make sure that shareholders break through.
The first order condition gives the following optimal level of effort of a bank at t = 1.
Non-securitising bank at t = 0
At t = 0 a bank knows what p1 will be, as a function of the probability p0 and the promised
return R1. This investment will take place only with a probability
1
2
. At t = 0 banks maximise
















where the expression 1
2
(
p0(R0− k−Dsec)− (γp0)2− g
)
is the expected payoff to shareholders
if a bank invests only at t = 0, and V NoSect=1 is the payoff if a bank also invests at t = 1, defined
in the equation 7.
In the presence of moral hazard the pricing of the secured debt with present value 1−k−g
is done in the following way. First banks make a take it or leave offer to the market to buy a
debt with the face value D¯sec, and present value dsec, where dsec = 1− k− g. Markets observe
the offer as well as the level of deposits k and the promised payoff on the investment R0, and
they correctly infer the effort that banks will choose to put into loan screening. This level of
effort also determines the probability with which the debt holders will be reimbursed If the
offer dsec, D¯sec is such that prospective buyers of the debt break even in expectation, they will
buy the debt. If not, the offer is rejected and a bank is left without additional funding. Banks
anticipate this, and they will offer the pair (d0, Dsec) such that the debt is fairly priced. After
the debt D¯sec is raised, banks choose the optimal level of effort. This ensures that banks do
not have incentives to shirk, and the secured debt is fairly priced.
From the technical perspective this means that banks maximise the shareholder value w.r.t.





1− k − g = E(Dsec)
E(Dsec) is determined by the prospective buyers of the secured debt who take into account
the probability with which they will be reimbursed in full, and the amount they receive if a
bank goes bankrupt. Denote a as the fraction of the loan that secures the claim Dsec. The
face value of debt Dsec with the present value equal to 1 − k − g must satisfy the following
equation:
1− k − g = 1
2




(p0Dsec + (1− p0)(p1min(Dsec, nR0a+min(Dsec − nR0a,max((1− a)nR0 +R1 − (1− g)− k, 0)))
+ (1− p− 1)min(Dsec, nR0a+min(Dsec − nR0a,max((1− a)nR− 0 + nR− 1− (1− g)− k, 0)))))
(9)
The first line in 1.13 accounts for the expected payoff in no investment is done at t = 1,
and the rest is the expected payoff if a bank finances the project at t = 1, and all funding
comes from deposits. I solve the model numerically.
.2 Objective function of a securitising bank
The objective function of a securitising bank under the conjecture that ps > ph
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When a bank faces an investment opportunity at t = 1, it already has loans in place,
some of which are financed through securitisation, and some are financed with the available
on-balance sheet funds. At t = 1 a bank chooses the optimal level of effort as a function of
R1, and of the optimal level of effort taken at t = 0.
The realisations of R1 and R0 are i.i.d. The expected equity value of a securitising bank at
t = 1 under the conjecture that ps,0 ≤ ph,0 writes as follows:




p1 (R0 +R1 − (1− g)− k −D0,s)
+ (1− p1)max (0, nR1 +R0 − (1− g)− k −D0,s)
)




0, R0n(k + g)(1− a0) +R0((k + g)a0 + 1− k − g)




0, nR1 +R0n(k + g)(1− a0) +R0((k + g)a0 + 1− k − g)




R0n(1− a0)(k + g) +R1 − (1− g)− k
)
− p2s ((k + g)a0 + d0,sec)− p2h(k + g)(1− a0)− p21 − 2g
)
(10)
where ps and ph are the success probabilities of a securitised and retained portfolio, determined
at t = 0 by the effort of a bank. k is the amount of deposits a bank had at t = 0, (1 − g)
is the quantity of deposits a bank receives at t = 1. Note the state-contingent nature of the
off-balance sheet debt: in the states of the world (1− ps), when a securitised portfolio of loans
does not pay off, a bank does not reimburse the holders of the ABS. In these states of the
world, a bank looses the fraction a0(k+ g) of the defaulted assets, which is seized by the ABS
holders, but they do not have to share with them the profit from a new investment opportunity
R1. d0,s = 1− k− g is the present value of a securitised debt with the face value Ds,defined as
D0,s = − 1
ps
((1− (1− a)(g + k))n(1− ps)R0 − 1 + g + k)




Securitising bank at t = 0, ps > ph
The optimisation problem of a securitising bank at t = 0 is has two components: the share-
holder value if there is no investment at t = 1, and the shareholder value if a bank will invest








where V Sec,Ps>Ph is the expected equity value if a bank does not invest at t = 1, which writes
as:
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V Sec,Ps>Ph =ph(R0 − k −D0,s) + (ps − ph)(R0n(k + g)(1− a0) +R0((k + g)a0 + 1− k − g)
− k −D0,s)− p2s ((k + g)a0 + d0,sec)− p2h(k + g)(1− a0)− g
The optimal level effort for a securitised portfolio and non-securitised portfolio are defined







Note that ps is taken for a given level of Ds, and therefore when taking the derivative of V
sec
0
w.r.t. ps, Ds is taken as constant. The functional form of Ds is plugged in the first order
condition after the derivative is taken. The optimal level of securitisation a0 takes into account
the impact on all the variables that it will have. I solve the model numerically: for given values
(R0, n, k, g) I find the optimal ps and ph for all a0 defined on a grid, and then take a0 that
gives the highest value. I do not find parameter values for which an interior solution for this
case would exist.
.3 Default threshold
A bank defaults to maximize the expected payoff to shareholders. This means that a bank
will default for the asset values for which shareholders get nothing in solvency. The payoff to
shareholders in solvency is:
PayoffSHSOLV = V (H1 + 1)− (H1 +D)
I consider only risky level of total debt, hence the payoff to shareholders in default is zero.
Therefore, the default threshold for banks is defined by the following expression:




When no fire sale liquidation occurs, bank’s default threshold is just its total debt divided




However, when banks have to deleverage, those who were close to the threshold H0+D
H0+1
will
be forced into bankruptcy, because they number of their assets will decrease:




Thus, the fire sale liquidation increases a banks default rate, all other things being equal.
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.4 Solution of the benchmark case with no fire sale ex-
ternality
.4.1 Solution of the model
I start the solution by finding the price that would clear the market. The supply of assets is






(H + 1)dV = (H + 1)
Vdef
2






The demand for the assets is a sum of demands (integral as this is a continuous case) across







(H + 1)V − (D +H)
P
dV = −(2n− P )(2(D − 1)n− (H + 1)P )
4n2P
Therefore, equilibrium price Peq is such that must equalizes supply and demand:






Next, firms will be conjecturing this level of price and will take the optimal level of debt
H and D as a function of price P that will later clear the market as in equation 11.















V (H + 1)− (H +D)
P







− (P − 2n)
2(n(3d−H − 4)− (H + 1)P )
n2P
+
6s((H + 1)P (D +H)− (D − 2)D −H(H + 2)− 2)
H + 1
+ 6P (D +H)− 3(D −H − 2)(D + 3H + 2)
H + 1
)
The first order condition for D is:
∂V0
∂D
= −((4(1+H)n2+(1+H)P 2−2nP (2−D+H+P +HP +(2−2D+P +HP )s))/(4(1+H)nP ))
⇒ Dopt = −4(H + 1)n
2 − 2nP (s(HP + P + 2) +HP +H + P + 2) + (H + 1)P 2
2nP (2s+ 1)
The FOC for H gives the following roots for H:
H = −1±
√
3(D − 1)2n2P (2s+ 1)√−(D − 1)2n2P (2s+ 1) (4n3 + 3n2P (2P (s+ 1)− 2s+ 3)− 3nP 2 + P 3)
However, it is straightforward to show in Mathematica that the discriminant−(D−1)2n2P (2s+
1) (4n3 + 3n2P (2P (s+ 1)− 2s+ 3)− 3nP 2 + P 3) is never positive for any values of the pa-
67
rameters allowed in this model. This means that there are no real roots of the derivative which
means that V0 is either increasing or decreasing in H.
Next note that V0 is discontinuous in H in the point H = −1. It is continous over the
interval (−∞,−1)⋃(−1,∞). Therefore, it is enough to determine the sign of the derivative




2P (2s((D − 2)D + P ) + (D − 2)D + 2(P + 2)) + 4n3 − 3nP 2 + P 3
12n2P
This derivative is always positive for the range of parameter values allowed in this model.





This gives the following optimal level of debt:
DNoExternopt = −
−2nP (2hs+ h+ Ps+ P + 1) + 4n2 + P 2
2hnP (2s+ 1)
(13)








V (Hopt + 1)− (Hopt +DNoExtopt )
P
dV (14)
where the l.h.s. of the expression is the total supply of assets in the market, and the r.h.s.
is the demand for these assets. Once this expression is simplified, it turns out that Pequil does
not depend on Hopt, and consequently on h.
To solve for the equilibrium price Peq and risky debt D
NoExtern
eq , I plug the optimal level
of debt 13 and the optimal level of H0 into the market clearing condition 11 and I find the
following polynomial of third degree w.r.t. P :
F (P ) = −4n3(P + 2) + 2n2P (P (P + 4)(s+ 1) + 4)− nP 2(P + 2)(2s+ 3) + 2P 3(s+ 1) (15)
The equilibrium price Peq is the root of the polynomial F (P ). Even though a polynomial
of third degree can have up to three roots, in all the numerical parameter values that I looked
at, there is only one root that satisfies the inequalities of this case.
.5 Model solution with a systemic externality, when price
is high: P ∈ (1, 2)
When price is high, not only banks do not have to sell anything to meet the collateral con-
straint in period t = 1, but in addition they can borrow more against the collateral because a
favourable price movement creates additional borrowing capacity for banks.
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(H + 1)V − (D +H)−mP
P
dV
where m is negative, implying that a bank borrow more against collateral and can buy addi-
tional −m units of assets in the secondary market, and Vdef = H+DH+1 .
Therefore, the price has to satisfy the following market clearing condition:
(2n− P )(2nD +mP − 1)− (H + 1)P ) + 2(H + 1)n2PVdef
4n2P
= 0




















((H + 1)V − (D +H)−m ∗ P )(nV − P )
P
dV
The FOC gives the following optimal level of unsecured debt D:
DEnhDemopt = −
4(H + 1)n2 − 2nP (s(HP + P + 2) +HP +H + P + 2) + (H + 1)P 2
2nP (2s+ 1)
(16)
The derivative of V0 w.r.t. H0 has no real roots for the range of parameters (0, 1) and
price P ∈ (1, 2). Next, the function V0(H0) is discontinuous in H0 only in the point H =
−1. This means that V0 is either monotonically increasing or decreasing over the interval
(−∞,−1)⋃(−1,∞). I find the sign of the derivative for H0 = 0, and this will give me the its







3n2P (2s((D − 2)D + P ) + (D − 2)D + 6P + 4)
+
3n(P − 1)(P − 2n)2
h




|H0=0 > 0 ∀

(h, n, s, ) ∈ (0, 1)








However, when price is within the interval (1, 2) and H is at its max, then the expected
value of the risky unsecured debt exceeds 1: D0 > 1. This cannot be done, as the number of
assets that bank acquires with debt and equity is normalized to 1. This implies that the corner
solution for D is s.t. D0 = 1.
However, there is no price that would clear the market in this case.
.6 Model solution with a fire sale spillover: P ∈ (1−h, 1)












V (H −m+ 1)− (D +H −mP )
P
dV
where m is the number of units banks will have to sell because they exceeded the margin
constraint.
























((H + 1−m)V − (D +H −mP ))(nV − P )
P
dV
The FOC gives the following optimal level of unsecured debt D:
DFSopt =
(H(P − 1) + P ) (2nP (s((2h− 1)P + 2) + hP + 2)− 4n2 − P 2)
2hnP 2(2s+ 1)





(P − 1)P (d2h2(2s+ 1)− (h− 1)(2hs+ h+ 1)(H(P − 1) + P )2)






4n(P − 1)(3(h− 1)P + 4)
hP 2
+
3(h− 1)(P − 1)P
hn
(18)
Once DFSopt is plugged in the equation 18, then
∂V FS0
∂H0
does not depend on H0 any more. This
means that when D is at the optimal level determined by the FOC, then H0 optimally takes
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either its maximum or its minimum level:{
∂V FS0
∂H0
|D=Dopt > 0⇒ Hopt = 1−hh
∂V FS0
∂H0
|D=Dopt < 0⇒ Hopt = P−hP1−P+hP
.6.1 Market clearing for the optimal levels of debt H0 and D
Once the optimal levels of debt H0 and D are plugged in, I get the following market condition
when H0 = Hmax =
P−hP
1−P+Ph :
F (P )NoFS =
−4n3(P + 2) + 2n2P (P 2(s+ 1) + 4P (s+ 1) + 4)− nP 2(P + 2)(2s+ 3) + 2P 3(s+ 1)
2n2P 2(2s+ 1)((h− 1)P + 1)
(19)
.7 Model solution without a fire sale spillover: P ∈ (1−
h, 1)





, again, it turns out
that once DNoFSopt is plugged in,
13 the derivative of V0 w.r.t. H0 does not depend on H0 any
more. This means that H0 is either 0 or
P−hP
1−P+hP . However, the derivative is never negative,
hence banks are always better off choosing
HNoFSopt =
P − hP
1− P + hP
However, I show that when within a framework with a fire sale it is optimal to choose H0 =
1−h
h
, then choosing H0 =
1−h
h
gives a higher expected firm value then the level H0 =
P−hP
1−P+hP .
This means that the only determining condition of the optimality of H0 is the optimality
condition of H0 in the model with a fire sale spillover, presented in in the Appendix .6.
.8 Analysis of the case when Pn <
D+H−m∗P
H+1−m
I analyze a possibility that the threshold above which it is optimal to acquire assets (which is
P/n) is below the default threshold, D+H−m∗P
H+1−m .
The expected firm value under this conjecture takes the following form:

























((H + 1−m)V − (D +H −mP ))(nV − P )
P
dV
Given that the FOC gives a system of equations which is not tractable analytically, I
search for solutions on the grid. I find that there is a solution for the following values of the
parameters:
h ∈ (3/10, 1)
n ∈ (0.765, 1)
s ∈ (0.775, 1)
.9 Frequency of systemic collapse when a given number



























Figure 9: The frequency of systemic collapse in the numerical simulations, as a function of the
number of banks that are hit by an exogenous shock.
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Figure 10: The average number of defaults following a systemic shock, a negative hit to the
assets of all financial institutions. X-axes, shock, reflects a percentage of the balance sheet of
















Figure 11: The average equilibrium asset price following a systemic shock, a negative hit to
the assets of all financial institutions. X-axes, shock, reflects a percentage of the balance sheet
of all banks that was wiped out following a negative systemic shock.
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.11 Parameters for the simulation of core-periphery
network.
Parameter Description Baseline calibration
N number of banks in the network 50
C bank’s cash 2% of the total assets
AIB interbank assets endogenously determined
ALoans loans to real economy balancing item
DIB interbank liabilities 35% of the total liabilities
Ddep deposits 61% of the total liabilities
E bank equity 4% of the total liabilities
hi asset increase of core banks 30
zi asset decrease of shock-hit banks 60
sbanks number of stressed banks (4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 16)
E(degree) average degree (5, 10, 25, 30)
Table 3: Model parameter calibration for core-periphery network simulation.
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Figure 12: The frequency of systemic collapse in the numerical simulations, as a function of
the number of banks that are hit by an exogenous shock. Case of a core-periphery network
with exponential degree distribution.
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.13 Comparison of the frequency of systemic collapse
and number of defaults in networks with exponential





















Binomial, degree=5 Exponential, degree=5
Figure 13: The frequency of systemic collapse in the numerical simulations, as a function of
the number of banks that are hit by an exogenous shock, when the average connectivity is 30.






















Binomial, degree=30 Exponential, degree=30
Figure 14: The frequency of systemic collapse in the numerical simulations, as a function of
the number of banks that are hit by an exogenous shock, when the average connectivity is 30.
Case of a core-periphery network with exponential degree distribution.
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